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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRANDON R. LANE, 
Defendant/Appellee, 
PEGGY HAY AND PATRICIA HAY, 
Victims/Appellants. 
Case No. 20070878-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Victims appeal from an order denying their motion to set aside the 
plea in abeyance and requesting evidentiary and restitution hearings. They also 
appeal from an order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss his plea in 
abeyance to two counts of negligent homicide, class A misdemeanors, and two 
counts of improper passing, class C misdemeanors. The Court of Appeals 
certified the case to this Court pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 43(a). R.278, 308. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78a-3-102(3)(b) (West 
Supp. 2008). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does the Rights of Crime Victims Act apply to misdemeanor 
prosecutions? 
2. Did the prosecutor violate the Victims' state constitutional and statutory 
rights by (a) misleading them about the substance of the plea agreement and the 
date of the plea hearing, (b) failing to fulfill her statutory duties regarding 
restitution; and (c) misrepresenting to the trial court that the Victims agreed with 
the terms of the plea agreement? 
3. Assuming that the Victim's rights were violated, can they obtain a 
misplea, or otherwise vacate Defendant's plea, based on a violation of their 
rights? 
Standard of Review for Issues 1-3. The foregoing issues involve 
interpretation of state statutes and a constitutional provision and thus present 
questions of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29,119,44 
P.3d 756. 
4. If a victim may not obtain a misplea, may the State nevertheless move 
for and obtain a misplea if it is established that the prosecutor committed a fraud 
on the trial court that led to its acceptance of the plea in abeyance? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following state constitutional provision, statutes, and court rule, 
whose full text is reproduced in Addendum A, are relevant to the resolution of 
this case: 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 28 (Victims' Rights Amendment); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (West Supp. 2008) (Sentencing); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-2a-l to -4 (West Supp. 2008) (Pleas in Abeyance); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-37-1 to -5 (West Supp. 2008) (Victims' Rights Act); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-38-1 to -14 (West Supp. 2008) (Rights of Crime 
Victims Act); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-38a-101 to -601 (West Supp. 2008) (Crime Victims 
Restitution Act); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 35 (Victims and Witnesses). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant's Plea in Abeyance Agreement 
In July 2005, the State charged Defendant with two counts of negligent 
homicide, class A misdemeanors, based on a February 2005, auto accident. R.6-7. 
On 12 September 2005, Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea in abeyance 
agreement. R.15-191, 19b-21 (a copy of the plea in abeyance agreement is 
attached as Addendum D and a copy of the order accepting the agreement is 
attached as Addendum E). 
1
 There is a clerical error in the pagination of the record. The Plea in 
Abeyance Agreement bears page numbers 15-18; the minute entry of the plea 
hearing bears page numbers 15-19. 
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The agreement required Defendant to plead guilty to two counts of 
negligent homicide, class A misdemeanors, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-5-206, and two coimts of improper passing, class C misdemeanors, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-706(l) and (2). R.16,19b-20. These pleas 
would be held in abeyance for twelve months. R.16,19b-20. 
The agreement also provided that defendant would pay $1,500 "for the 
benefit of the victims7 families[,]" complete a driving awareness course of at least 
eight hours, perform forty hours of community service, violate no law other than 
non-moving traffic violations, and appear before the court whenever required. 
R.18. The agreement specified that the State "will not bring any other charges or 
actions for restitution against Defendant for . . . events related to [the] automobile 
accident/' R.16. 
At the plea hearing, the prosecutor, Ms. Karen Allen, and defense counsel, 
Mr. Robert Faust, explained the terms of the agreement to the trial court. 
R.231:2-5 (a copy of the transcript is attached as Addendum F). Although the 
prepared agreement specified that Defendant would pay $1,500 in restitution, the 
prosecutor told the trial court that she didn't seen any value in Defendant paying 
that amount "at this point." R.231:3. She explained that she wanted the court to 
address restitution separately because the Victims had incurred excessive 
medical bills, "over a million dollars right now" on one of the victims, and the 
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issue of how much the insurance companies were going to pay was still 
unresolved. R.231:3. The prosecutor asked the court to "leave the damage issue 
open." R.231:4. 
The trial court then asked if Defendant had liability insurance. R.231:4. 
Defense counsel responded that Defendant had a $50,000 policy that had "all 
been paid out" and that no additional funds were available. R.231:4. He also 
explained that Defendant's wife, who was also injured in the accident, had 
waived her right to any insurance proceeds and that the $1,500 was "what we 
were able to come up with in regards to what they could fit . . . within their 
budget." R.231:4. 
The prosecutor explained that she believed the Victims would consider a 
$1,500 payment as "a slap in the face." R.231:4. The trial court then asked 
whether the case was actually settled. R.231:4. The prosecutor responded that 
"we are settled, but I guess I'm just saying I don't know why he needs to pay 
$1,500." R.231:5. 
In response, the trial court suggested that the $1,500 could be paid as a 
"plea in abeyance fee . . . toward the Judge's retirement fund[,]" and asked, 
"Would that make the family feel better?" R.231:5. Defense counsel then 
suggested that the court interlineate the agreement to specify where the funds 
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were to go- R.231:5. The trial court interlineated the order accepting the plea in 
abeyance to specify that the $1,500 would be paid as a "PIA fee,"2 R.20. 
During the plea colloquy, the prosecutor volunteered to the court that she 
had gone to Denver before the plea hearing and met with the Victims. R.231:8. 
The prosecutor stated that the Victims "had a lot of concerns at first, but I think 
that they are good with the agreement." R.231:8. The Victims were not present 
at the plea hearing, nor did they appear through counsel. R.231:l-ll. 
The Victims' Allegations3 
After listening to an audio recording of the plea hearing, the Victims 
believed that the prosecutor had misrepresented to them the substance of the 
plea agreement, and had misrepresented to the trial court their opinion of the 
agreement. R.51-58, 190-97. The Victims allege that the prosecutor met with 
them on 31 August 2005 to discuss the plea agreement. R.53, 192. They claim 
that the prosecutor told them that she was considering allowing Defendant to 
plead guilty to both counts of negligent homicide, and holding the plea to one of 
those counts in abeyance for three years, but sentencing him on the other. R.54, 
193. They also claim that they told the prosecutor that they wanted a restitution 
order because they did not want to be forced to sue Defendant civilly. R. 56,195. 
2
 The acronym presumably stands for "Plea In Abeyance/' 
3
 Because no evidentiary hearing was held below, the Victims' version of 
events is taken from their affidavits filed in support of their motions. 
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The Victims claim that the prosecutor told them to organize their expense 
records and send them to her office because they would be relevant at 
sentencing. R.56,195. 
The prosecutor allegedly told the Victims that a sentencing hearing would 
probably be held in January where they could appear and address the court. 
R.56, 194-95. According to the Victims, the prosecutor told them that the 12 
September 2005 hearing was just a status hearing and that the plea hearing 
would likely be held on 26 September 2005. R.55,194. 
The Victims also allege that documents in the prosecutor's file demonstrate 
that she had already agreed to settle the case before she met with them. R.57-58, 
196. A letter from Defendant's counsel, dated 15 August 2005, allegedly appears 
in the prosecutor's file. R.57-58,196. (A copy of the letter, with attachments, is 
included in the record at R.94-99). In this letter, defense counsel thanks the 
prosecutor for resolving the case, states that he plans to see the prosecutor on 12 
September 2005 "to conclude this matter," and attaches a copy of the same plea 
in abeyance agreement accepted by the court. R.57-58,196. 
Proceedings on the Victims' Motions 
On 27 January 2006, the Victims, through counsel, filed a motion for a 
restitution hearing. R.24. On 3 August 2006, the Victims filed a "Motion To Set 
Aside Plea In Abeyance And For Evidentiary Hearing." R.35-39. On 14 August 
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2006, the trial court entered an order staying the plea in abeyance period 
pending resolution of the Victims' motions. R.45. 
The State did not respond to either of the Victims' motions. R.204. After 
receiving both the Victims' and Defendant's memoranda, the trial court entered a 
ruling and order denying the motions. R.204-05 (a copy of the ruling is attached 
as Addendum B). 
The Victims timely appealed from this order. R.219. Pursuant to the 
Victims' request, the trial court agreed to extend the stay of the plea in abeyance 
period until the appeal was resolved. R.212,217. 
Although the trial court denied the Victims' motion, it stated that it would 
"schedule a hearing at which, should the victims desire, victim impact 
statements may be presented." R.205-06. The court intended the hearing as "an 
attempt to provide the victims with the fairness, respect, and dignity 
contemplated by the Utah Constitution." R.205. In a later telephonic conference 
to schedule this hearing, the court noted that it had already "ruled definitively 
on the issue of the plea." R.212. The victim impact hearing was held 5 
November 2007. R.305-06. 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss 
While the Victims' appeal was pending, Defendant filed in the trial court a 
"Motion To Dismiss Plea In Abeyance of Defendant Pursuant to U.C.A.77-2a[-]2 
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(5)." R.232-39. The trial court granted Defendant's motion, allowed Defendant 
to withdraw his guilty pleas, and dismissed the case with prejudice. R.300-02 (a 
copy of this Order is attached as Addendum C, a copy of the transcript from the 
hearing on the motion is attached as Addendum G). 
The Victims also timely appealed from this order. R313. The Court of 
Appeals certified both appeals to this Court. R.278,308. This Court consolidated 
the appeals into this case. R.311-12. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A Deadly Decision 
On a wet and foggy February morning in 2005, brothers Dan and John Hay 
were traveling home to Colorado with their wives Peggy and Patricia. R.3,17, 
52. The four were in a Jeep traveling eastbound on Highway 40 near Duchesne. 
R.3,17. Dan and John were in the front seat; Peggy and Patricia were in the back. 
R.3,17,51-52,190-91. 
Defendant was traveling westbound on the same two-lane highway. R.3, 
17,199. He was driving a Ford F-250 Super-Duty diesel pick-up truck. R.3,17. 
One witness recalled that defendant passed her vehicle "at an excessively] high 
speed/7 R.199. Ahead were several other vehicles, all traveling behind a semi 
tanker truck that was pulling a pup trailer. R.3,17. Defendant passed each of the 
other vehicles until he reached the semi. R.199. He then pulled into the 
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oncoming traffic lane and began accelerating past the semi's pup trailer. R.3,17, 
199. Defendant failed to see the Hay's Jeep until it was too late. R.3,17, 51-52, 
199. 
Recognizing that a head-on collision was imminent, and being blocked on 
the right by the semi, defendant swerved to the south shoulder. R.3, 17. The 
Hays also swerved south. R.3, 17. Defendant's truck slammed into the Hay's 
Jeep head on. R.3,17. Both vehicles came to rest in a ditch near a sign reading 
"Passing Lane 500 Ft." R.199. 
The Victims 
Patricia and Peggy were severely injured and hanging upside down from 
their seatbelts. R.52,191,199. It took over a half an hour for emergency crews to 
arrive and begin extracting them. R.52. Peggy was unconscious for at least part 
of that time. R.199. Patricia waited in anguish, wondering if her husband 
survived. R.52. He did not. R.3, 202. Both Dan and John were killed instantly. 
R.3,202. 
Peggy suffered life-threatening injuries and was in a coma for at least ten 
days. R.191. She suffered cardiac arrest, kidney failure, multiple broken bones, 
and a ruptured aorta, spleen, and diaphragm. R.191. She has endured ten major 
surgeries. R.191. Patricia suffered lacerations to her head, severe bodily trauma, 
and four broken bones in her arm. R.52. 
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Dan and Peggy had been married forty-two years. R.190. In addition to 
his wife, Dan is survived by two daughters, three grandchildren, and two step 
grandchildren. R.190. John and Patricia had been married thirty-nine years. 
R.51. John is survived by three children and five grandchildren. R.51. He had 
retired in January, 2005, one month before the accident. R.51. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Rights of Crime Victims Act applies to misdemeanor prosecutions. 
Although the Act is ambiguous, a harmonious reading of its relevant provisions, 
together with the legislative history of the 1997 amendment, clarify that the 
amendment was intended to extend the Act to misdemeanor prosecutions. 
2. If the Victims' allegations are true, then their rights were violated. The 
prosecutor allegedly misled them about the substance of the plea agreement, 
mislead them about their rights to be present and heard in court, and failed to 
secure for them any court-ordered restitution. 
3. The Victims cannot obtain any substantive remedy for these violations. 
As harsh as that conclusion appears, it is the most reasonable interpretation of 
the relevant law. The constitutional and statutory provisions governing victims' 
rights specifically prohibit the Victims from obtaining the remedies that they 
seek. Additionally, these provisions allow a victim to challenge only court 
orders directed toward her (such as denial of her right to be heard). A victim 
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may not challenge a court's orders directed toward the defendant (such as 
acceptance of a plea). Victims are limited to the remedies provided by statute 
because the Victims Rights' Amendment is not self-executing. Sound policy also 
favors this limitation on victims' remedies because victims are not parties to a 
criminal case. 
4. However, this case involves more than the prosecutor's violation of the 
Victims' rights. If the Victims' allegations are true, then the prosecutor 
committed a fraud on the trial court by misrepresenting the Victims' position on 
the plea. Such malfeasance must be addressed by granting a misplea. 
Although the Victims' cannot move for a misplea, the State can. Therefore, 
this Court should remand this case for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the 
prosecutor committed a fraud on the trial court. If she did, then the State would 
move for a misplea. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS ACT APPLIES TO CLASS A 
MISDEMEANORS 
The trial court denied the Victims' motion to set aside the plea in abeyance 
on the ground that the Victims' constitutional and statutory rights were not 
violated because the Rights of Crime Victims Act did not apply to a 
misdemeanor prosecution. R.205 (Add. B). The Victims contend that a 1997 
amendment extended the Act, except for its notice provisions, to cases involving 
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class A and B misdemeanors. Br. Aplt. at 20-30. The Victims argue that the Act 
is ambiguous, but that interpretation of its relevant provisions and reference to 
the legislative history of the 1997 amendment resolves the ambiguity. Br. Aplt. at 
20-30. The State agrees. 
A. The plain language of the Act is ambiguous. 
This Court's "'primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the 
statute was meant to achieve.'" State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, 1 16, 137 P.3d 726 
(quoting Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 2004 UT 75,1 11,100 P.3d 1171). This Court 
will "'read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its 
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related 
chapters/" Id. (quoting Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, f 17, 66 P.3d 592). This 
Court will "look to other interpretive tools such as legislative history" only if it 
finds that a statute is ambiguous. Id. (citing Adams v. Swensen, 2005 UT 8, % 8, 
108P.3d725). 
The Utah Constitution sets forth crime victims' general rights. UTAH 
CONST, art I, § 28. The relevant section states that it "shall extend to all felony 
crimes and such other crimes or acts . . . as the Legislature may provide." Id. at § 
28(3). That section also states that "[t]he Legislature shall have the power to 
enforce and define this section by statute." Id. at § 28(4). 
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The Rights of Crime Victims Act defines the general rights enumerated in 
the State Constitution. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-38-1 to -14 (West Supp. 2008).4 
As originally enacted in 1994, the Act applied "to all felonies filed in the courts of 
the state of Utah and, if specifically provided, to cases in the juvenile court." § 
77-38-5 (1994). It provided, among other rights, that victims may be present or 
heard (and often both) at the "important criminal justice hearings" specified in 
the Act. § 77-38-4(1) (1994). It also required the prosecutor to notify victims of 
"important criminal justice hearings." § 77-38-3(3) (1994). It defined the term 
"important criminal justice hearings" as "the following proceedings in felony 
criminal cases" and listed various court hearings. § 77-38-2(3) (1994) (emphasis 
added). 
A1997 amendment to section 77-38-5 extended the Act "to any class A and 
class B misdemeanor." 1997 Laws of Utah ch. 103, § 3. However, the 
amendment specifically excluded misdemeanor cases from the Act's notice 
requirements, id. at § 2, presumably to avoid overburdening prosecutors with 
requiring notice to victims in the myriad of misdemeanor cases filed each year. 
The amendment created an ambiguity within the statute. Although it 
explicitly extended the Act to Class A and B misdemeanors, it did not amend the 
definition of "important criminal justice hearings" in section 77-38-2(5) to include 
4
 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory citations are to the West 
Supplement for 2008. 
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misdemeanor hearings. Id. at § 1. Thus, under the amended version of the Act, 
which is the version at issue here, section 77-38-5 extends the Act to class A and B 
misdemeanors, and section 77-38-4(1) specifies that victims have the right to be 
present or heard at various "important criminal or juvenile justice hearings/7 but 
section 77-38-2(5) defines those "important. . . hearings" as those held only "in 
felony criminal cases." UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-38-2(5), -4(1), -5. 
This Court can resolve this ambiguity by interpreting the Act as a whole, 
and consulting the legislative history of the 1997 amendment. See Holm, 2006 UT 
31, 1 16 (noting that this Court interprets statutes as a whole and will consult 
legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguities). 
B. Reference to the Act's other relevant provisions and legislative 
history resolve the ambiguity. 
Reading the Act as a whole demonstrates that the Legislature intended the 
1997 amendment to extend the Act to class A and B misdemeanors. The Victims 
correctly observe that the "carve out" provision of the amendment that excepted 
misdemeanors from the Act's notice requirements were unnecessary if the 
Legislature had intended that the Act apply only to felonies. Br. Aplt. at 22-23. 
The Victims also correctly observe that the legislative history of the 1997 
amendment demonstrates that it was intended to extend the Act to 
misdemeanors. Br. Aplt. at 24-26. The portions of the floor debates quoted in the 
Victims' brief resolve any doubt about the scope of the Act. Br. Aplt. at 24-26. 
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Given the Act's ambiguity, the district court's ruling that the Act did not 
apply in this misdemeanor case was understandable. However, the State agrees 
with the Victims that this ruling was incorrect. This Court should hold that the 
Act applies to cases in which class A or B misdemeanor charges are filed. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-5(2). 
II. THE PROSECUTOR VIOLATED THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS 
The Victims allege that the prosecutor violated their state constitutional 
rights "to be treated with fairness, respect and dignity/' Br. Aplt. at 30-39. They 
claim that the prosecutor did so in three specific ways by "fail[ing] to follow legal 
obligations regarding victims' rights/' Br. Aplt. at 33. 
First, the Victims argue that the Victims Rights Act required the prosecutor 
to "informfl and assist" them and to provide them with "clear explanations 
regarding relevant legal proceedings." Br. Aplt. at 31, 34-36; UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-37-3(b) and (c). They also assert that rule 35(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure required the prosecutor to inform them about the substance of the 
plea agreement. Br. Aplt. at 36-37. The Victims claim that the prosecutor 
violated these statutory provisions and rule by misinforming them about the 
substance of the plea agreement and the date of the plea hearing. Br. Aplt. at 31, 
34-37. 
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Second, the Victims claim that under State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, J 32, 44 
P.3d 756, a prosecutor has a duty as an officer of the court to convey to the court 
a victim's request to be heard. Br. Aplt. at 37-38. Casey interpreted both the 
Victims' Rights Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-37-3(l)(c), and the Rights of Crime 
Victims Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-4(1), to require prosecutors to "convey 
requests to be heard." Id. at \\27-32. In addition to the prosecutor's statutory 
duties, this Court also held that "as an officer of the court, a prosecutor must 
convey a victims' request to be heard at a change of plea hearing." Id. at \ 33. 
The Victims claim that the prosecutor violated this duty by failing to tell the trial 
court that she had misinformed them about the substance of the plea agreement 
and by misrepresenting to the trial court that the Victims were satisfied with the 
terms of the plea agreement. Br. Aplt. at 37-38. 
Finally, the Victims contend that under the Crime Victims Restitution Act, 
the prosecutor was required at the plea hearing to provide the trial court with 
"the names of all victims asserting claims for restitution and the actual or 
estimated amount of restitution." Br. Aplt. at 38 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
38a-202(l)(a). The Victims contend that the prosecutor failed to do so. 
This Court has emphasized that prosecutors "have an obligation to ensure 
that the constitutional rights of crime victims are honored and protected." Casey, 
2002 UT 29 at H 32-37. In addition to the responsibilities incumbent upon all 
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officers of the court, a prosecutor possesses additional "unique responsibilities" 
with respect to victims because of her position as a "minister of justice/7 Id. at % 
32. Thus, this Court has held that a prosecutor violates a victim's rights when 
she fails to (1) assist the victim in exercising her right to be heard, (2) provide the 
victim with a clear explanation of the events transpiring at a change of plea 
hearing, and (3) inform the court of the victim's desire to be heard. See id. at W 
35,37. 
In this case, the State agrees with the Victims that, if the allegations in their 
affidavits are true, then the prosecutor violated their statutory rights. 
III. THE VICTIMS CANNOT OBTAIN A MISPLEA, SET ASIDE THE 
PLEA IN ABEYANCE AGREEMENT, OR OTHERWISE REOPEN 
THIS CASE 
Although the State agrees that the Victims7 rights were violated, the State 
does not agree that the Victims are entitled to the remedies that they seek, or any 
other remedy that would reopen this case. The Victims ask this Court to either 
"declare a misplea" or "set aside the plea in abeyance." Br. Aplt. at 62, 75. The 
Victims also ask this Court to direct that once a subsequent conviction is 
obtained, the trial court should "conduct a full evidentiary restitution hearing." 
Br. Aplt. at 62, 75. However, both the Utah Constitution and the Rights of Crime 
Victims Act specifically prohibit the Victims from obtaining these remedies. 
Additionally, the statutory scheme governing victims' rights allows victims to 
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challenge only orders that affect them directly. Victims are limited to the 
remedies provided by statute because the provisions of the Victims Rights' 
Amendment are not self-executing. Sound policy also favors this limitation on 
victims' rights because victims are not parties to a criminal case. 
A. Both the Victims' Rights Amendment and the Rights Of Crime 
Victims Act prohibit the remedies that the victims seek. 
The Victims claim that the "straightforward remedy" for violation of their 
right "to be treated with fairness, dignity and respect and to be heard at a plea 
hearing is . . . a declaration of a 'misplea.'" Br. Aplt. at 63. However, both 
constitutional and statutory provisions prohibit this remedy. 
The Victims' Rights Amendment to the Utah Constitution declares that 
"[n]othing in this section shaU be construed as creating a cause of action for 
money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or for dismissing any criminal charge, 
or relief from any criminal judgment." UTAH CONST, art. I, § 28. 
Similarly, the Amendment's implementing legislation, the Rights of Crime 
Victims Act, states that "[t]his chapter may not be construed as creating a basis 
for dismissing any criminal charge or delinquency petition, vacating any 
adjudication or conviction, admission[,] or plea of guilty or no contest, or for 
appellate, habeas corpus, [sic] or other relief from a judgment in any criminal or 
delinquency case." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-12(2). 
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These provisions prohibit a misplea based on the Victims' motion because 
a misplea would amount to relief from a criminal judgment. See UTAH CONST, 
art. I, § 28(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-12(2). A misplea could not be granted 
without first reopening the judgment dismissing this case with prejudice. 
Granting a misplea would also vacate defendant's guilty pleas, in violation of 
section 77-38-12(2). 
Nor can the Victims obtain their alternative proposed remedy: an order 
"set[ting] aside just the agreement holding the plea in abeyance and let[ting] the 
guilty plea stand (if the defendant so chooses)." Br. Aplt. at 66. While this result 
would arguably not "vacate" defendant's guilty plea, it would nevertheless 
amount to "relief from a criminal judgment" because it would reopen this case 
that has been dismissed with prejudice. 
The Victims' request for a restitution hearing fails for the same reason. As 
the Victims' recognize, a restitution hearing would only be possible if this case 
were reopened and either a misplea granted or the plea in abeyance agreement 
set aside. Br. Aplt. at 62. Therefore, a restitution hearing is not possible without 
relief from the judgment in this case. 
Nothing in the Victims' Rights Amendment or section 77-38-12(2) indicates 
that these provisions were intended to prevent only defendants from seeking 
relief based on a violation of a victim's rights. These provisions contain no 
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words of limitation that would prevent their application here. This Court will 
"look beyond the plain language only if [it] find[s] some ambiguity/' State v. 
Burns, 2000 UT 56, i 25, 4 P.3d 795. The Victims allege no ambiguity in these 
provisions, and the State perceives none. In fact, the Victims ignore these 
provisions. 
An earlier section demonstrates that the Legislature was capable of 
drafting a provision applying only to defendants. Section 77-37-5(5), found in 
the preceding chapter, containing the "Victims' Bill of Rights," states: "[t]he 
person accused of and subject to prosecution for the crime . . . has no standing to 
make a claim concerning any violation of the provisions of this chapter." Had 
the Legislature similarly intended to limit the effect of section 77-38-12(2) to 
defendants, it would have done so. 
The Victims seek relief that is prohibited by both state constitutional 
provision and statute. Therefore, their claims fail. 
B. The constitutional and statutory provisions governing victims' 
rights allow victims to challenge only court action that affects 
them directly. 
If these prohibitions on available remedies were not sufficiently clear, the 
structure of the statutory scheme governing victims' rights demonstrates that the 
Victims cannot obtain the remedies that they seek. The structure and language 
of the Rights of Crime Victims Act allow victims to challenge only court action 
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that affects them directly. Those provisions make clear that, while a victim may 
challenge a court's orders directed toward her (such as denial of her right to be 
heard), she may not challenge a court's orders directed toward the defendant 
(such as acceptance of a plea). 
The Act specifies how the rights of victims are to be enforced. Specifically, 
"the enforcement mechanism is an action for a court order requiring a criminal 
justice agency to comply with the rights contained in the Victims' Rights 
Amendment and the Rights of Crime Victims Act." Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the 
Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 
1994 Utah L. Rev. 1373,1419. 
"The Act provides for two kinds of suits." Id. One is "an action for 
injunctive relief," § 77-38-11(1), the other is "an action for declaratory relief or for 
a writ of mandamus defining or enforcing the rights of victims and the 
obligations of government entities under this chapter." § 77-38-ll(2)(a)(i). 
The Act also provides that "[a]dverse rulings on these actions or on a 
motion or request brought by a victim of a crime or a representative of a victim 
of a crime may be appealed under the rules governing appellate actions, 
provided that no appeal shall constitute grounds for delaying any criminal or 
juvenile proceeding." § 77-38-ll(2)(b). Thus, while a victim may challenge on 
appeal a court's actions affecting her directly (such as the right to be heard), she 
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may not challenge actions directly affecting the State or defendant (such as 
acceptance of a plea). 
This conclusion is apparent from this subsection's proviso protecting 
defendants' speedy trial rights. Since "[a]U of the rights contained in [the Act] 
shall be construed to conform to the Constitution of the United States," § 77-38-
12(4), the victim's right to be heard is necessarily subordinate to the defendant's 
right to a speedy trial. Thus, under the Act, "no appeal shall constitute grounds 
for delaying any criminal or juvenile proceeding." § 77-38-11 (2)(b). 
Ordinary pretrial delays may create a window for a victim to "bring an 
action for declaratory relief or for a writ of mandamus . . . enforcing the rights of 
victims." § 77-38-ll(2)(a)(i). However, where, as here, no such window exists, 
the criminal proceeding will go forward. 
This proviso would make no sense if victims had standing to challenge the 
court's actions with respect to defendants, such as accepting a guilty plea or 
imposing sentence. However, it makes perfect sense if a victim is permitted to 
seek only clarification of his own right to be present or heard. 
Of course, allowing the criminal action to progress will ordinarily moot the 
victim's appellate challenge. However, the Legislature anticipated and provided 
for this very eventuality: "[a]n appellate court shall review all such properly 
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presented issues, including issues that are capable of repetition but would 
otherwise evade review/' § 77-38-11 (2) (c). 
In other words, although the criminal action is proceeding and may in fact 
have concluded below—otherwise rendering the victim's appeal moot—the 
appellate court should nonetheless address it in the interest of public policy. 
The language of the Victims' Rights Amendment and the Act provides 
further support for the conclusion that a victim may challenge only court action 
that directly affects her. As discussed, subsection (2) of the Amendment states 
that its provisions may not be the basis "for dismissing any criminal charge, or 
relief from any criminal judgment." UTAH CONST., art. 1, § 28(2). Likewise, 
section 77-38-12(2) plainly forbids vacating a guilty plea or obtaining any other 
"relief from a judgment" based on a violation of the Act. § 77-38-12(2). 
"'One of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts 
will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the 
entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject.'" 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
Masich v. U.S. Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 108, 191 P.2d 612, 616 
(1948)). 
The sense of this legislation is apparent. Where the trial court denies a 
victim's motion or request for notice, to be present, heard, or to exercise any 
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other enumerated right, the victim may appeal. The criminal proceeding, 
however, progresses, and subsequent guilty pleas and convictions remain intact. 
The appellate court must hear the victim's appeal even if the progression of the 
criminal case below has rendered it technically moot. However, a victim cannot 
use a violation of the Amendment or the Act as the basis for vacating a plea or 
sentence, or any other court action that directly affects the defendant. 
1. Justice Wilkins' concurring opinion in Casey foresaw 
that the Act could leave victims with rights but no 
remedies. 
In his concurring opinion in Casey, Justice Wilkins foresaw that the Rights 
of Crime Victims Act could place victims in the very plight in which the Victims 
in this case now find themselves—having rights but no remedies. See 2002 UT 29 
at H47-49 (Wilkins, J., concurring). A prosecutor or trial court may deny a 
victim her right to be present or heard at a plea hearing and the victim may 
appeal the denial of that right. However, because a criminal proceeding moves 
forward under section 77-38-11 (2) (b) while that appeal is pending, Justice 
Wilkins recognized that "the victim has little hope of a meaningful remedy/' Id. 
at 147. He observed that this Court's "hands are tied by the same constitutional 
and statutory provisions that [give victims their] right to be heard in the first 
place." Id. at f 48. "[I]n practice, the right of a victim to be heard at a change of 
plea hearing is fragile at best, and may be made illusory by the intentional or 
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unintentional mishandling of the situation by the prosecutor or the trial court, all 
without meaningful remedy/' Id. at 1 49. Although Justice Wilkins suggested 
that the Legislature reconsider the statute, see id., it has not yet done so. 
2. Other jurisdictions reach this same conclusion. 
Other courts have reached this same conclusion under their jurisdictions' 
victims' rights legislation. For example, in Ex Parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d 81 (S.C. 
2000), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that "[t]he trial court cannot use 
the Victims' Bill of Rights to re-open a completed criminal proceeding. Further, 
even if the [prosecutor] fails to honor the Victims' Bill of Rights during a criminal 
proceeding, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to re-open a criminal 
proceeding once it is resolved." Id. at 85. The Court concluded, "[a] writ of 
mandamus under the Victims' Bill of Rights is reserved to enforce its provisions, 
not to re-open a case when a victim is unhappy with its outcome." Id. at 87. 
Similarly, in State ex rel. Goldesberry v. Taylor, 233 S.W.3d 796, 797, 799 (Mo. 
App. 2007), the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected the State's motion to set aside 
a conviction and sentence on the grounds that the victim was not given the 
opportunity to be heard at the plea hearing. The court held that "whatever 
special accommodations may be afforded to the victims under the victims' rights 
provisions, such provisions contain no authorization for a court to set aside a 
guilty plea." Id. at 799. 
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Amicus cites People v. Stringham, 206 Cal.App.3d 184 (Cal. App. 1988), as 
an example of a case "allowing [a] trial court to set aside a plea based on crime 
victims' objections." Amicus Br. at 11 n.6. However, Stringham is distinguishable 
because the trial court never formally accepted Stringham's guilty plea prior to 
setting it aside. 206 Cal. App. 3d at 189,195. Thus, Stringham simply establishes 
that a trial court can rescind its conditional acceptance of a plea before 
sentencing. Id. at 193-97. 
C. Victims are limited to statutorily provided remedies because the 
Victims' Rights Amendment is not self-executing. 
The Victims seem to presume that the Victims' Rights Amendment is self-
executing and therefore they can seek whatever remedy they deem necessary to 
vindicate their right to be treated "with fairness, respect, and dignity." Br. Aplt. 
at 30-39, 51-68. However, the Amendment is not self-executing. Therefore, the 
Victims are limited to the remedies provided by the legislation defining and 
enforcing their state constitutional rights. 
"[A] self-executing constitutional clause is one that can be judicially 
enforced without implementing legislation." Spackman v. Bd. of Educ, 2000 UT 
87, 1 7, 16 P.3d 533. "'[Qourts may give effect to a provision without 
implementing legislation if the framers intended the provision to have 
immediate effect and if no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a 
right given/" Id. (quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996)). 
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Conversely, provisions that "merely indicate a general principle or line of policy 
without supplying the means for putting them into effect" are not self-executing. 
Id. 
Under this standard, the provisions in the Victims' Rights Amendment are 
not self-executing. The Amendment states general principles and policies as 
opposed to specific directives. See UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 28. The Amendment 
explicitly states that victims rights are "defined by law," not by the language of 
the Amendment itself. Id. at § 28(1). It also explicitly requires that the 
Legislature draft legislation implementing its provisions. Id. at § 28(4). The 
Amendment looks to the Legislature "to enforce and define this section by 
statute." Id. 
Because the rights in the Victims' Rights Amendment are not self-
executing, victims are limited to the remedies provided in the implementing 
legislation. If a right "is not a common-law right, but is one created by statute," 
then "the law creating the right can also prescribe the conditions of its 
enforcement." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183,1185 (Utah 
1996) (citing Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 228 P. 557, 560 (Utah 1924)). 
Crime victims' rights are a creature of recent legislation, not the common law. 
See State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, f 18 n.6, 44 P.3d 756 (recognizing that Utah's 
victims' rights legislation was a reaction to the victims' rights movement of the 
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early 1970's). Therefore, the legislation defining victims rights also provides the 
exclusive remedies for a violation of those rights.5 See Clyde, 920 P.2d at 1185. 
D. Sound policy reasons support the conclusion that victims cannot 
challenge court action that directly affects the parties. 
Sound policy justifies limiting victims' ability to challenge court action to 
only those actions that directly affect them, not the parties. First, victims are not 
parties to a criminal case. The criminal justice system was specifically designed 
to make the community, not the victim, the prosecuting entity. Second, allowing 
victims to challenge actions affecting the parties would create a significant 
potential for defendants to exploit the remedy. 
1. The Act properly limits victims' remedies because 
victims are not parties. 
The Act properly limits a victim's ability to challenge orders that do not 
affect her directly because a victim is not a party to a criminal case. As a non-
party, a victim cannot challenge court action that directly affects the parties. 
5
 The Victims' Open Courts challenge, see Br. Aplt. at 72-74 (citing UTAH 
CONST., art. I, § 11), fails for the same reason. The Open Courts Clause "is not an 
absolute guarantee of all substantive rights." See Tindley v. Salt Lake City School 
Dist., 2005 UT 30, f 17, 116 P.3d 295. Rather, the Clause applies only to 
legislation that limits or abrogates remedies that existed when the Clause was 
enacted. See id. (recognizing that the Clause "applies only to legislation which 
'abrogates a cause of action existing at the time of its enactment.'") (citing Laney 
v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, f 50,57 P.3d 1007). Because victims' rights were not 
recognized when the Open Courts Clause was enacted, the Clause is not 
applicable. See id. 
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Although a victim may have an interest in the outcome of a criminal case, 
she is not a party to that case. See State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33,130,24 P.3d 936. 
In Harrison, this Court considered the extent to which a minor victim of sexual 
abuse could participate, through her guardian ad Utem, in the criminal trial of 
her abuser. Id. at I f 28-33. In holding that it was error to allow the guardian ad 
litem to sit at coimsel table and question witnesses, this Court observed that 
"[t]he interests of a child victim are not always the same as the interests of the 
parties to a criminal case: the defendant and the State/' Id. at f 30. Therefore, 
this Court concluded that a victim is not "an interested party." Id; see also, State v. 
Lamberton, 899 P.2d 939, 941 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc) (although victims have "right 
to be heard at 'criminal proceedings/ we cannot conclude that victims are 
'parties' with the right to file their own petitions for review"). Professor Beloof 
dubs victims "participants." Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal 
Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 289,290. 
In Cooper v. District Court, 133 P.3d 692 (2006), the Alaska Court of Appeals 
considered the extent to which a victim may participate in a criminal proceeding. 
The victim in Cooper claimed that Alaska's victims' rights legislation allowed her 
to bring an original action for relief claiming that the district court erred in 
sentencing the defendant. Id. at 694. The court dismissed the petition, holding 
that "[t]he right to challenge the sentencing decision rests solely with the parties 
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to this criminal prosecution—the plaintiff, Municipality of Anchorage, and the 
defendant, Daniel Cooper/' Id. at 719. In reaching this holding, the court noted 
that "courts from other states are unanimous in holding that a crime victim does 
not have the right to participate as an independent party in a criminal case/' Id. 
at 696,701-705 (collecting cases). 
Because victims are not parties, the laws governing their rights properly 
prevent them from challenging court action that directly affects the parties, even 
though that action may also affect them. This Court recognized this principle in 
Harrison when it held that a guardian ad litem's participation in a criminal case 
"would be peripheral, and strictly limited to matters relating specifically to the 
treatment of the child victim, such as assuring that the victim received notice and 
opportunity to be present and heard as mandated by the victims' rights statutes." 
2001 UT 33, <j[ 28. Likewise, the Alaska Court of Appeals concluded in Cooper 
that although there will be times when a crime victim is dissatisfied with a case's 
outcome, "we, as a society, have decided that it is fairer to let public officials 
make these decisions, rather than putting the victim in charge of making these 
decisions, or letting the victim second-guess or veto these decisions." 133 P.3d at 
711. 
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2. Allowing victims to challenge convictions based on plea 
agreements would create a significant potential to abuse 
the remedy* 
Allowing victims to challenge a guilty plea will create a significant 
potential for dishonest defendants or victims to exploit the remedy by making 
false claims. A defendant who had second thoughts about his plea could exploit 
this remedy by manipulating his victim into falsely claiming that the prosecutor 
violated her rights during the plea bargaining process. The danger of such 
manipulation is greatest in domestic violence cases, which involve particularly 
vulnerable victims. Given this potential for abuse, sound policy supports the 
limitations on victims' remedies. 
IV. A MISPLEA WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE IF THE 
PROSECUTOR COMMITTED A FRAUD ON THE TRIAL COURT 
For the reasons explained above, the Victims cannot move for a misplea, 
and any misplea cannot be based on a violation of the Victims' rights. However, 
the State can move for a misplea, and a party's fraud that leads a trial court to 
accept a guilty plea is an appropriate ground for granting a misplea. If the 
prosecutor lied to the trial court when she represented that the Victims agreed 
with the terms of the plea agreement, then she committed a fraud on the trial 
court. If that fraud led the court to accept the plea, then a misplea would be 
appropriate. Therefore, this Court should remand this case to the trial court for 
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an evidentiary hearing to determine if the prosecutor did commit a fraud on the 
court. If so, the State would then move for a misplea. 
A. Under State v. Kay, a misplea should be granted when fraud leads 
a trial court to accept a guilty plea. 
This Court first recognized the remedy of a misplea in State v. Kay, 717 
P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986). While robbing a Cedar City bar, Kay shot three people 
execution-style. Id. at 1296. The State charged him with three counts of first 
degree murder, all capital felonies, and four counts of aggravated robbery, all 
first degree felonies. Id. Three weeks before his scheduled trial, Kay's counsel 
presented the trial court with an "'In-Camera Motion for Conditional Plea of 
Guilty[,]'" offering that Kay would plead guilty as charged and confess in open 
court in exchange for the promise that he would not be sentenced to death. Id. 
The State was unaware of the terms of the plea until the motion was presented to 
the court. Id. 
The motion was presented in chambers and discussed at length off the 
record. Id. The trial court granted a one-hour recess to allow the State to 
consider the matter, and Kay to consult with his counsel. Id. A plea colloquy 
was then conducted on the record where Kay pleaded guilty as charged '"on the 
condition that [his] life not be forfeited/" and gave a full confession detailing the 
robbery and murders. Id. at 1296-97 (alteration in original). The trial court 
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accepted the pleas. Id. at 1297. The State never objected on the record to the 
pleas. Id. 
Two weeks after the plea hearing, a new attorney appeared for the State 
and asked the trial court to reconsider its acceptance of the pleas. Id. This 
occurred after the details of Kay's confession were reported in the media and 
several public demonstrations were held in Cedar City protesting the plea 
agreement. Id. One demonstration "involved parading an effigy of Kay crowned 
with the head of a dead pig through the town with a placard calling for the recall 
of the trial judge in the upcoming elections/' Id. 
After a lengthy hearing on the State's motion, the trial court vacated the 
promise of life imprisonment on the groimds that (1) the State had been 
surprised by, and had disagreed with the plea agreement, and (2) the conditional 
plea was illegal and therefore its acceptance constituted plain error. Id. The 
court gave Kay the option of facing a sentencing hearing where the death penalty 
could be imposed, withdrawing his guilty pleas and going to trial, or pursuing 
an interlocutory appeal. Id. 
On appeal, Kay sought specific enforcement of the original agreement. Id. 
This Court disagreed, reasoning that a "misplea" was appropriate. Id. at 1303-07. 
This Court first addressed, and rejected, both of the State's contentions that 
Kay's pleas should be invalidated because they violated rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
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of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 1300-02. First, the Court held that the acceptance of 
a "conditional plea" did not violate Rule 11. Id. at 1300-01. Second, the Court 
held that although the trial court violated Rule 11 by participating in the plea 
negotiations, there was no evidence that the State did not acquiesce in the 
negotiated agreement. Id. at 1301,1305. Therefore, the Rule 11 violation did not 
invalidate Kay's pleas. Id. at 1301-02. 
This Court then explained why a misplea should be declared. Id. at 1302-
07. Relying on the analysis in United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1983), 
and analogizing to the granting of a mistrial, this Court held that a misplea can 
be properly granted where "'manifest necessity'" so requires.6 Id. The Court 
explained that a misplea is the equivalent of a mistrial. See id. at 1303-05. The 
mistrial concept recognizes that a defendant can be tried a second time, even 
though jeopardy attached in his first trial, if "manifest necessity" required his 
first trial to be terminated before a verdict was reached. See id. at 1303. Similarly, 
a misplea recognizes that although jeopardy has attached because a guilty plea 
6
 Since Kay's issuance, the First Circuit has recognized that "the [United 
States Supreme] Court seems to have overruled our double jeopardy analysis in 
Cruz:' United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616,619 (1st Cir. 1987). The case to 
which the First Circuit refers is Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984). The First 
Circuit interpreted Johnson as holding that "an acceptance of a guilty plea is 
legally different from a conviction based on a jury's verdict." Santiago Soto, 825 
F.2d at 619. Therefore, the First Circuit concluded in Santiago Soto that, under 
Johnson, it is "unnecessary to demonstrate 'manifest necessity' to warrant a 
judicial vacation of a guilty plea." Id. 
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has been accepted, the plea may be properly set aside based on a showing of 
"manifest necessity/7 See id. at 1303-05. 
This Court enumerated two specific circumstances in which a misplea 
would be appropriate. See id. at 1305. First, "where obvious reversible error has 
been committed in connection with the terms or the acceptance of the plea 
agreement and no undue prejudice to the defendant is apparent." Id. Second, 
"where some fraud or deception by one party leads to the acceptance of the plea 
agreement by the other party or the court." Id. Realizing that it could not 
anticipate every possible misplea scenario, this Court also recognized that 
"[t]here may be other circumstances where the balancing of the interests and 
legitimate expectations of the defendant and the public will also warrant a 
misplea." Id. 
This Court reasoned that the following circumstances in Kay justified the 
declaration of a misplea. Id. at 1305-06. First, Kay's counsel "initiated [a] series 
of errors" when, in violation of Rule 11, "he proposed a plea bargain to the trial 
court without having first obtained the State's consent." Id. at 1305. Second, the 
trial court "erred by entertaining the plea" because it should have determined 
whether the prosecutor agreed with the proposal before considering it. Id. at 
1305-06. The prosecution then "compounded" these problems by failing to 
timely object to the plea and, in fact, by appearing to acquiesce in the plea. Id. at 
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1306. However, this Court noted that despite a lack of record support, the trial 
court had found that the State did disagree with the plea. Id. at 1305, 06. This 
Court countenanced that finding on the grounds that the trial judge was in a 
better position to ascertain the State's true position. Id. at 1305. Given these 
circumstances, a misplea was appropriate. Id. at 1306. 
B. If the Victims' allegations are true, then a misplea should be 
granted. 
Had the trial court been informed of the Victims' disagreement with the 
proposed plea agreement, it could have properly refused to accept the 
agreement. See State v. Montiel, 2005 UT 48, \ 13, 122 P.3d 571 ("[I]t is well 
established under Utah law that trial courts are not required to accept plea 
agreements"). The trial court could have rejected the proposed plea agreement 
based on either the prosecutor's failure to correctly inform the Victims about the 
agreement's terms, or the Victims' disagreement with its terms. See Montiel, 2005 
UT 48, \ 29 (citing Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1,25 (Ky. 2004)). 
In this case, if the Victims' allegations are true, a misplea should be 
granted under Kay's second misplea category: "fraud . . . by one party lead[ing] 
to the acceptance of the plea agreement by . . . the court."7 717 P.2d at 1305. The 
7
 A misplea would not be appropriate under Kay's first circumstance 
because, as explained in Point HI, even if the Victims' rights were violated in 
connection with the acceptance of the plea, that error is not "reversible error." 
See Kay, 717 P.2d at 1305. 
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Victims allege that, at the plea hearing, the prosecutor misrepresented to the trial 
court that they were satisfied with the plea agreement. Br. Aplt. at 9,38. If that 
is true, then Kay's second misplea circumstance would be satisfied. See 717 P.2d 
at 1305. 
Subsequent cases interpreting Kay have articulated the misplea standard as 
requiring a showing of both "'manifest necessity' and 'no undue prejudice to the 
defendant/" State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, % 27,17 P.3d 1145 (quoting State v. 
Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1025, (Utah App. 1996) (in turn quoting Kay, 717 P.2d at 
1305). However, Kay requires the additional showing of "no undue prejudice to 
the defendant" only with respect to a misplea based on "obvious reversible 
error." See 717 P.2d at 1305. 
However, even if the additional showing was necessary, it is satisfied in 
this case. Defendant would suffer no "undue prejudice" by the declaration of a 
misplea because a misplea would not deprive him of anything to which he was 
entitled. See Montiel, 2005 UT 48, % 13; see also State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50, f 13, 
165 P.3d 1185 ("There is no right to a plea offer or to a successful plea bargain"). 
If the trial court finds that the prosecutor committed a fraud on the court, and 
that, but for that fraud, it would have rejected the plea, then declaring a misplea 
would merely deprive defendant of a windfall. Any prejudice to defendant in 
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negating his windfall would not qualify as "undue prejudice/' See Kay, 717 P.2d 
at 1305. 
Moreover, a misplea would be significantly less prejudicial to Defendant 
than the misplea was to Kay. One condition of Kay's plea agreement was that he 
not face the possibility of a death sentence. Id. at 1296. The misplea deprived 
him of that benefit. Id. at 1307. However, the stakes in this case are significantly 
lower. Defendant was originally charged with only two counts of negligent 
homicide, class A misdemeanors. R.6-7. 
Kay could arguably be distinguished from this case on the ground that Kay 
bore some responsibility for creating the circumstances that generated the 
misplea, whereas Defendant here apparently does not. However, as explained, a 
misplea in this case would simply deprive Defendant of something to which he 
was never entitled. 
The State cannot locate any other case addressing the precise issue before 
the court. However, in a concurring opinion in State v. Comstock, 485 N.W.2d 354 
(Wis. 1992), Justice Steinmetz observed that "any incorrect statement that the 
victim acquiesces to in [sic] the plea arrangement may create a fraud on the court 
resulting in the judge later voiding the entire proceedings/' Id. at 370. 
Other courts that have considered whether a victim can set aside a guilty 
plea based on a violation of the victim's rights have all refused to do so. See State 
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ex rel. Goldesberry v. Taylor, 233 S.W.3d 796, 797-99 (Mo. App. 2007); State v. 
Means, 926 A.2d 328, 334-35 (N.J. 2007); Ex Parte Littkfield, 540 S.E.2d 81, 86-87 
(S.C. 2000); State v. McAlear, 519 N.W.2d 596,597-600 (S.D. 1994). As explained in 
Point HI, those holdings are correct. However, none of those cases involved a 
prosecutor defrauding a trial court into accepting the plea agreement. See 
Goldesberry, 233 S.W.3d at 797-99 (trial court was not mislead about the victim's 
position, it was simply ignorant of that position); Means, 926 A.2d at 334-35 
(because the victims were not aware of the plea agreement, there was no 
evidence that the victims objected to the plea); Ex Parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d at 82-
83, 86 (the victims complaining that they were denied an opportunity to address 
the court did not qualify as "victims" under the statute); McAlear, 519 N.W.2d at 
597-98 (prosecutor truthfully informed the court that she had not discussed the 
agreement with the victim). 
The Victims allege that the prosecutor committed fraud on the trial court 
that may have led to its acceptance of the plea. If those facts are true, a misplea is 
appropriate under Kay's second circumstance. See 717 P.2d at 1305. 
C. Remand is necessary to determine whether a fraud occurred. 
A remand is necessary to determine whether the prosecutor actually 
committed a fraud on the trial court. At this point, the claim of fraud is based 
solely on statements in the Victims' affidavits. Those allegations have never been 
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tested. No evidentiary hearing was held below and no findings of fact have been 
entered regarding the prosecutor's communications with the Victims. Therefore, 
an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether a fraud occurred that 
led the trial court to accept the plea. 
Remand for factual findings is appropriate when a trial court has not ruled 
on a dispositive factual issue* For example, in State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 227 
(Utah 1989), this Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing "to determine the 
voluntariness of defendant's confession." Strain moved to suppress his 
confession on the grounds that the Miranda warning was defective and that 
police threats and promises rendered the confession involuntary. Id. at 222. The 
trial court denied Strain's motion but "did not specifically address the 
voluntariness challenge." Id. Therefore, this Court remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing because the record was inadequate to address the voluntariness issue. 
Id. at 227. Likewise, this Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing in State v. 
Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 996 (Utah 1993), where the trial court denied Abeyta's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea on jurisdictional grounds without reaching 
the underlying factual issue regarding the knowing and voluntary nature of his 
plea. See also, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (remanding for an 
evidentiary hearing); Stan Katz Real Estate Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142, 1144 
(Utah 1977) (same). 
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The State's failure to contest the Victims' allegations below does not 
prevent this Court from remanding for an evidentiary hearing. The State did 
have an opportunity to contest the Victims' allegations below. However, it did 
not need to. The Victims filed their affidavits in support of their motions for a 
misplea and a restitution hearing. As explained above in Point EI, the Victims 
could not properly obtain these remedies. Therefore, there was no reason for the 
State to contest the Victims' allegations. The proposed remedy of the State 
moving for a misplea based on the prosecutor's alleged fraud on the court was 
not considered until the Attorney General's Office reviewed the case. The 
truthfulness of the Victims' allegations did not become an issue until then. 
D. Granting a misplea would not violate Double Jeopardy. 
Defendant claimed in the Court of Appeals that vacating his plea in 
abeyance would violate the protection against double jeopardy. Br. Appellee in 
Case No. 20061126-CA. Amicus perceives no such barrier to a misplea. Br. 
Amicus at 9-11. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause "protects against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense." 
Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294,306-307 (1984). 
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The double jeopardy issue here is technically "unripe for adjudication/7 
State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 371 (Utah 1995) (citing Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake 
County Comm'n, 624 R2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981)). It will ripen only if (1) this 
Court either determines that, under the law, the Victims are entitled to vacate 
Defendant's plea, or that a remand is necessary to determine if the prosecutor 
committed fraud on the court; (2) this Court declares a misplea based on the 
Victims' affidavits, or the trial court finds that the prosecutor committed fraud 
on the court and grants the State's subsequent motion for misplea; (3) the State 
pursues a second prosecution for the same offenses, and (4) Defendant asserts a 
double jeopardy defense. See State v. Ortiz, 1999 UT 84, \ 4, 987 P.2d 39 (where 
there are several possible circumstances under which the appellate court would 
not need to address the issue presented by the petition, that issue is not ripe for 
adjudication). Accordingly, the double jeopardy issue is not yet ripe. 
Nevertheless, the issue looms on the horizon, and Defendant briefed the 
issue in the Court of Appeals. Therefore, because this Court may choose to 
address the question of double jeopardy, the State will brief it. 
Kay establishes that "'jeopardy attaches upon acceptance of the guilty 
plea.'" Kay, 717 P.2d at 1303 (quoting Cruz, 709 R2d at 114) (bracketing in 
original). However, where "manifest necessity" justifies the declaration of a 
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misplea, a plea agreement may be set aside and the prosecution may proceed 
without violating the Federal or State Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 1304. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that if the 
granting of a mistrial meets the "'manifest necessity' requirement," then the 
Double Jeopardy Clause "d[oes] not bar retrial." Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 
458, 459 (1973); accord Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516 (1978); Garrett v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 773,796 (1985). 
In this case, if the trial court finds that the prosecutor committed a fraud 
on the court, then the grant of a misplea would fall squarely within Kay's second 
misplea category. See Kay, 717 P.2d 1305 (declaring that a misplea would be 
appropriate where fraud by a party led the trial court to accept the plea). 
Therefore, continued prosecution would not be barred by either the Federal or 
State Double Jeopardy Clauses because the misplea would satisfy the "manifest 
necessity" standard. See id. at 1303; Somerville, 410 U.S. at 459. 
Satisfying Kay's second misplea category would be sufficient to overcome 
any double jeopardy challenge. See 717 P.2d at 1303, 1305. Nevertheless, 
additional considerations would also defeat any double jeopardy bar. 
The double jeopardy protections that arise when a defendant pleads guilty 
are less weighty than those that arise when a defendant goes to trial. This Court 
has recognized "that double jeopardy considerations are not as heavily 
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implicated in a plea bargain as in a trial setting/' Kay, 717 R2d at 1305 (citing 
Cruz, 709 R2d at 114). 
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has held that "[a] plea agreement involves a 
qualitatively distinct type of jeopardy from that which attaches after a trial and 
conviction/' United States v. Thompson, 814 F.2d 1472,1479 (10th Cir. 1987). "The 
most important value" that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects "is the 
prevention of Government harassment." Id. However, a defendant who pleads 
guilty "is far less likely to be subject to Government abuse." Id. Presumably, 
both the defendant and the Government negotiate from an equal bargaining 
position. Id. "Furthermore, the double jeopardy protection is intended to 
prevent exposure to the risk of conviction." Id. (citing Abney v. United States, 431 
U.S. 651, 661 (1977) (emphasis in original). A defendant who pleads guilty "is 
not exposed to the risk of conviction. On the contrary, he knows exactly what 
will happen in the proceeding." Id. Similarly, any anxiety or embarrassment 
that may be associated with a plea bargain differs from that associated with a 
trial. Id. "The defendant who pleads guilty does not 'run the gauntlet' in the 
same way a defendant who goes to trial does." Id. 
Additionally, continued prosecution in this case would not appear to 
violate any of the principles that the double jeopardy protection is designed to 
protect. The protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
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acquittal or conviction "ensures that the State does not make repeated attempts 
to convict an individual, thereby exposing him to continued embarrassment, 
anxiety, and expense, while increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction or an 
impermissibly enhanced sentence/' Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984). 
As explained, these concerns are significantly alleviated when a conviction 
results from a guilty plea. 
Moreover, there was neither a conviction nor an acquittal in this case 
because Defendant's guilty pleas were withdrawn and the case dismissed. 
Therefore, it is unclear whether the protection against a second prosecution 
would even apply in this circumstance. 
Nor would the protection against cumulative punishments bar additional 
proceedings in this case. That protection does not create an absolute bar to the 
imposition of a second punishment in a subsequent proceeding. See id. at 499. 
Rather, it "is designed to ensure that the sentencing discretion of the courts is 
confined to the limits established by the legislature." Id. at 499. If a punishment 
is imposed in a proceeding that is later vacated, and a subsequent proceeding 
results in the imposition of a second punishment, "the Clause's third protection 
ensures t h a t . . . a defendant receives credit for time already served." Id. (citing 
North Carolina v. Vearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718 (1969)). Therefore, in this case, 
Defendant can receive a second punishment in a subsequent proceeding without 
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violating his double jeopardy protections provided he receives credit for the 
money he has paid and the time he has spent in community service and a driving 
course. See id. 
Moreover, subsequent imposition of restitution would not violate double 
jeopardy protections as long as the amount imposed may "'fairly be 
characterized as remediaL", See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1027 (Utah 
1996) (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,448-49 (1989)). "The sole test to 
be used in making this determination requires a court, on a case-by-case basis, to 
compare the harm suffered as a result of a defendant's conduct with the size of 
the civil penalty." Id. A restitution order "can be considered 'punishment'" only 
"[i]f the amount of the penalty is so grossly excessive that it cannot be fairly 
characterized as compensatory or remedial." Id. Therefore, subsequent 
imposition of a restitution order in this case would not violate double jeopardy 
protections if the amount ordered was equivalent to the Victims' pecuniary loss. 
See id. 
E. The dismissal in this case does not preclude granting a misplea. 
The trial court accepted Defendant's plea in abeyance agreement on 12 
September 2005. R.15-17, 19b-21. The agreement specified that Defendant's 
guilty pleas would be held in abeyance for twelve months. R.16,19b-20. 
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On 14 August 2006, the trial court granted the Victims' motion to stay the 
plea in abeyance period while the Victims' motions for a misplea and requesting 
a restitution hearing were pending. R.45. At that point, 336 of the 365 days in 
the abeyance period had elapsed, leaving 29 days remaining. 
On 9 November 2006, the trial court entered a ruling and order denying 
the Victims' motions for misplea and a restitution hearing. R.204-06. The 
Victims then notified the court of their intention to appeal and requested that the 
stay remain in place until the appeal was resolved. R.211-12. On 20 November 
2006, the trial court entered an order continuing the stay of the plea in abeyance 
pending appeal and clarifying that any violations of the law by Defendant 
during the stay would not violate the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. 
R.216-17. 
On 14 June 2007, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss his plea in abeyance 
on the grounds that UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-2(5) imposes an eighteen-month 
maximum on the period that a plea to a misdemeanor charge may be held in 
abeyance. R.232-39. Defendant argued that the trial court should dismiss the 
case because eighteen months had passed since the acceptance of the plea in 
abeyance and he had completed everything required of him under the plea in 
abeyance agreement. R.232-39. 
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On 27 August 2007, the trial court granted Defendant's motion and 
dismissed the case with prejudice. R.276. The trial court based its ruling on the 
language of section 77-2a-2(5) and the Court of Appeals' interpretation of that 
section in State v. Schubarth, 2005 UT App. 166U. R.300-02. The trial court also 
found that continuing the stay pending an appeal would amount to a delay of 
the criminal case in violation of section 77-38-ll(2)(b). R.302. 
The dismissal in this case does not preclude the granting of a misplea 
because a misplea would invalidate the basis for the dismissal. The case was 
dismissed because the trial court found that, under section 77-2a-2(5), it could not 
stay the plea in abeyance term beyond eighteen months. R.300-02. However, if 
the plea in abeyance was fraudulently accepted, then it is void and cannot 
support the dismissal. 
Moreover, Defendant has not completed the terms of his plea in abeyance. 
The twelve-month abeyance period has not expired, because the period was 
stayed with 29 days remaining. R.45. That stay was never lifted and therefore 
the remaining 29 days never elapsed before the case was dismissed with 
prejudice. R.216-17, 276. Therefore, neither the language of section 77-2a-2(5), 
nor the holding in Schubarth, precludes a misplea in this case. 
Section 77-2a-2(5) states that "[a] plea shall not be held in abeyance for a 
period longer than 18 months if the plea was to any class of misdemeanor or 
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longer than three years if the plea was to any degree of felony or to any 
combination of misdemeanors and felonies/' UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-2(5). 
The Victims argue that the three-year period applies in this case because 
Defendant pled to a "combination of misdemeanors/7 Br. Aplt. at 50. The 
Victims are incorrect. 
Defendant did plead to two class A misdemeanors and two class C 
misdemeanors. R.16. However, the statute's three-year period is only triggered 
if the plea is to "any combination of misdemeanors and felonies." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-2a-2(5) (emphasis added). This conjunctive phrase plainly requires 
that, to trigger the three-year period, a plea must include at least one felony 
charge. The Victims' reading renders the words "and felonies" inoperative, and 
is therefore incorrect. See State ex rel. MM., 2003 UT 54, \ 8, 82 P.3d 1104 
(reaffirming that when interpreting a statute, this Court's "'fundamental duty'" 
is "'to give effect, if possible, to every word of the statute'") (quoting Arredondo v. 
Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 2001 UT 29, f 13,24 P.3d 928). 
Nevertheless, although the eighteen-month maximum applies in this case, 
it was not violated. As explained, Defendant's plea has only been held in 
abeyance for 336 days. R.45. Although the plea in abeyance term was stayed, 
Defendant was not subject to the terms of the plea during the stay. R.216-17. 
Therefore, his plea has not been held in abeyance for a period longer than that 
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provided in section 77-2a-2(5). Additionally, if a misplea is declared, then the 
basis for the dismissal is invalidated. 
State v. Schubarth does not apply for the same reason. In Schubarth, the trial 
court approved a plea agreement that required holding the defendant's pleas in 
abeyance for six years. 2005 UT App 166U, % 2. When Schubarth failed to make 
his restitution payments, the trial court found that he violated the agreement and 
entered his guilty pleas. Id. at Tl 1-2. Schubarth then sought a misplea on the 
basis that the six-year term violated section 77-2a-2(5), even though he had 
originally requested that term because it allowed him "to make his restitution 
payments realistic and feasible" by extending them over a longer time. Id. at *n 
2-3 n.2. The Court of Appeals agreed that a misplea was appropriate because the 
six-year term violated 77-2a-2(5). Id. at 13. 
Schubarth establishes that a plea in abeyance agreement that subjects a 
defendant to its terms for a period longer than the maximum established by 
section 77-2a-2(5) is invalid and therefore unenforceable. Id. at H 1-3. The plea 
in abeyance agreement in this case did not violate that principle. Defendant has 
been subject to the terms of the plea in abeyance for only 336 days and, under the 
agreement, can only be subject to the terms of the agreement for a maximum of 
365 days. R.45. 
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For the same reason, the trial court's grant of a stay did not violate 
Schubarth. The stay did not require Defendant to be subject to the plea in 
abeyance agreement for longer than eighteen months. Rather, it tolled that time 
at 336 days and contemplated that the remaining 29 days would begin running 
after the Victims' appeal was concluded. R.45,216-17. 
Finally, section 77-38-ll(2)(b) does not prevent the grant of a misplea in 
this case. That section prevents a victim's appeal from delaying a criminal case. 
§ 77-38-ll(2)(b). However, it does not prevent a court from vacating the result of 
the case when that result was fraudulently obtained. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Victims may not obtain a misplea, or any other remedy that 
would reopen this case, this Court should affirm the order denying the Victims' 
motion for a misplea and restitution hearing. Nevertheless, because the plea 
may have been entered as a result of a fraud on the trial court, this Court should 
remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the prosecutor defrauded the 
trial court at the plea hearing and, if so, to allow the State to move for a misplea. 
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Respectfully submitted /^ May 2008. 
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Utah Attorney General 
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UTAH CONST, art. I, § 28 [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
(1994) 
(1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process, 
victims of crimes have these rights, as defined by law: 
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from 
harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice process; 
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and to be heard at 
important criminal justice hearings related to the victim, either in person 
or through a lawful representative, once a criminal information or 
indictment charging a crime has been publicly filed in court; and 
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of imposing an 
appropriate sentence, receive and consider, without evidentiary 
limitation, reliable information concerning the background, character, 
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense except that this 
subsection does not apply to capital cases or situations involving 
privileges. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a cause of action 
for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or for dismissing any criminal 
charge, or relief from any criminal judgment. 
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony crimes and such 
other crimes or acts, including juvenile offenses, as the Legislature may 
provide. 
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and define this section 
by statute. 
76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences 
allowed—Civil penalties—Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and 
medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity 
for extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 11, Chapter 
38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for 
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a 
plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall 
follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation 
expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure 
to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under 
Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each 
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually 
transported in a single trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, 
the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that 
the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental 
entity for the extradition. 
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless 
otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant 
shall pay restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration in the county 
correctional facility before and after sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in 
incarceration in the county correctional facility; and 
(ii) (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county 
correctional facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; 
or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided 
under Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as 
defined in Section 64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 
64-13e-102. 
(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the daily 
inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs for the 
county correctional facility. 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include 
expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing 
reasonable accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with 
a disability as defined and covered by the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical 
and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under 
this Subsection (6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the 
restitution, the court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-
302(5)(c)(i) through (iv) and shall enter the reason for its order on the 
record. 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity 
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-
1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the 
defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
Pleas In Abeyance 
77-2a-l. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the 
prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest 
from the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction 
against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply 
with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into 
between the prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms 
and conditions upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the 
court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
77-2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement — Negotiation - Contents — Terms 
of agreement — Waiver of time for sentencing. 
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior 
to entry of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court 
may, upon motion of both the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, 
hold the plea in abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction against the 
defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant within the time periods 
contained in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations 
for a plea in abeyance and at the time of acknowledgment and affirmation 
of any plea in abeyance agreement unless the defendant shall have 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. 
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by i < ti n i ,<>l .it nny ronrl 
hearing relating to a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(4) (a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant and approved by the court shall include a 
full, detailed recitation of the requirements and conditions agreed to by the 
defendant and the reason for requesting the court to hold the plea in 
abeyance. 
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and 
felonies, the agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance by 
the court, be executed by the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the 
defendant's counsel in the presence of the court. 
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 
months if the plea was to any class of misdemeanor or longer than three 
years if the plea was to any degree of felony or to any combination of 
misdemeanors and felonies. 
(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be approved unless the 
defendant, before the court, and any written agreement, knowingly and 
intelligently waives time for sentencing as designated in Rule 22(a), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea — Powers of court. 
(1) (a) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance 
agreement shall be done in full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(b) In cases charging offenses for which bail may be forfeited, a plea in 
abeyance agreement may be entered into without a personal appearance 
before a magistrate. 
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon 
finding that the defendant has successfully completed the terms of the 
agreement: 
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction 
and impose sentence for a lower degree of offense; or 
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the 
(6) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms 
of a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may reduce the degree of the 
offense or dismiss the case only as provided in the plea in abeyance 
agreement or as agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a defendant for 
any lesser offense pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may 
not invoke Section 76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense. 
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections io assist in the 
administration of the plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were 
on probation to the court under Section 77-18-1. 
(5) The terms of a plea in abeyance agreement may include: 
(a) an order that the defendant pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance 
f11', with a surcharge based on the amount of the plea in abeyance fee, both 
of which shall be allocated in the same manner as if paid as a fine for a 
criminal conviction under Section 78-3-14.5 and a surcharge under Title 63, 
Chapter 63a, Crime Victim Reparation Trust, Public Safety Support Funds, 
Substance Abuse Prevention Account, and Services for Victims of Domestic 
Violence Account, and which may not exceed in amount the maximum fine 
and surcharge which could have been imposed upon conviction and 
sentencing for the same offense; 
(b) an order that the defendant pay restitution to the victims of his 
actions as provided in Title 77 Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Ad; 
(c) an order that the defendant pay the costs of any remedial ui 
rehabilitative program required by the terms of the agreement; and 
(d) an order that the defendant comply with any other conditions which 
could have been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and 
sentencing for the same offense. 
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both 
the prosecuting attorney and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting 
attorney not to agree to a plea in abeyance is final. 
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual 
offense against a victim who is under the age of 14. 
(8) Beginning on July 1,2008, no plea may be held in abeyance in any 
case involving a driving under the influence violation under Section 41-6a-
502. 
77-2a-3.1. Restrictions on pleas to driving under the influence 
violations. 
(1) As used in this section, a "driving under the influence court" means 
an intensive judicially supervised treatment program: 
(a) as defined by rules of the Utah Judicial Council; and 
(b) that has been approved by the Utah Judicial Council as a driving 
under the influence court. 
(2) (a) A plea may not be held in abeyance in any case involving a 
driving under the influence violation under Section 41-6a-502 that is 
punishable as a felony or class A misdemeanor. 
(b) A plea to a driving under the influence violation under Section 41-6a-
502 that is punishable as a class B misdemeanor may not be held in 
abeyance unless: 
(i) (A) the plea is entered pursuant to participation in a driving under 
the influence court; and 
(B) the plea is approved by the district attorney, county attorney, 
attorney general, or chief prosecutor of a municipality; or 
(ii) evidentiary issues or other circumstances justify resolution of the 
case with a plea in abeyance. 
(6) A plea to a driving under the influence violation under Section 41-6a-
502 may not be dismissed or entered as a conviction of a lesser offense 
pursuant to Subsection (2)(b)(i) if the defendant: 
(a) has been convicted of any other violation which is defined as a 
conviction under Subsection 41-6a-501(2); 
(b) has had a plea to any other violation of Section 41-6a-502 held in 
abeyance; or 
(c) in the current case: 
(i) operated a vehicle in a negligent manner proximately resulting in 
bodily injury to another or property damage to an extent requiring 
reporting to a law enforcement agency under Section 41-6a-401; 
(ii) had a blood or breath alcohol level of .16 or higher; or 
(iii) had a passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
the offense. 
77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement — Hearing — Entry of 
judgment and imposition of sentence - Subsequent prosecutions. 
(1) it, at any time during the term of the plea m abeyance agreement, 
information comes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court 
that the defendant has violated any condition of the agreement, the court, 
at the request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion and 
affidavit, or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the 
defendant to appear before the court at a designated time and place to 
show cause why the court should not find the terms of the agreement to 
have been violated and why the agreement should not be terminated. If, 
following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant has 
failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of the plea in 
abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment 
of conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the offense to 
which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of conviction 
and imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in 
abeyance fee prior to termination of the agreement shall be credited against 
any fine imposed by the court. 
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent 
entry of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar 
any independent prosecution arising from any offense that constituted a 
violation of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the original 
plea was placed in abeyance. 
Victims' Rights Act (1987) 
77-37-1. Legislative intent. 
w The Legislature recognizes the duty of victims and witnesses of crime 
to fully and voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutorial 
agencies, the essential nature of citizen cooperation to state and local law 
enforcement efforts, and the general effectiveness and well-being of the 
criminal justice system of this state. In this chapter, the Legislature declares 
its intent to ensure that all victims and witnesses of crime are treated with 
dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity, and that the rights extended in 
this chapter to victims and witnesses of crime are honored and protected 
by law in a manner no less vigorous than protections afforded criminal 
defendants. 
(2) The Legislature finds it is necessary to provide child victims and 
child witnesses with additional consideration and different treatment than 
that usually afforded to adults. The treatment should ensure that children's 
participation in the criminal justice process be conducted in the most 
effective and least traumatic, intrusive, or intimidating manner. 
77-37-2. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Child" means a person who is younger than 18 years of age, unless 
otherwise specified in statute. The rights to information as extended in this 
chapter also apply to the parents, custodian, or legal guardians of children. 
(2) "Family member" means spouse, child, sibling, parent, grandparent, 
legal guardian. 
(3) "Victim" means a person against whom a crime has allegedly been 
committed, or against whom an act has allegedly been committed by a 
juvenile or incompetent adult, which would have been a crime if 
committed by a competent adult. 
(4) "Witness" means any person who has been subpoenaed or is 
expected to be summoned to testify for the prosecution or who by reason of 
having relevant information is subject to call or likely to be called as a 
witness for the prosecution, whether any action or proceeding has 
commenced. 
77-37-3. Bill of Rights. 
(1) The bill of rights for victims and witnesses is: 
(a) Victims and witnesses have a right to be informed as to the level of 
protection from intimidation and harm available to them, and from what 
sources, as they participate in criminal justice proceedings as designated by 
Section 76-8-508, regarding witness tampering, and Section 76-8-509, 
regarding threats against a victim. Law enforcement, prosecution, and 
corrections personnel have the duty to timely provide this information in a 
form that is useful to the victim. 
(b) Victims and witnesses, including children and their guardians, have 
a right to be informed and assisted as to their role in the criminal justice 
process. All criminal justice agencies have the duty to provide this 
information and assistance. 
(c) Victims and witnesses have a right to clear explanations regarding 
relevant legal proceedings; these explanations shall be appropriate to the 
age of child victims and witnesses. All criminal justice agencies have the 
duty to provide these explanations. 
(d) Victims and witnesses should have a secure waiting area that does 
not require them to be in close proximity to defendants or the family and 
friends of defendants. Agencies controlling facilities shall, whenever 
possible, provide this area. 
(e) Victims are entitled to restitution or reparations, including medical 
costs, as provided in Title 63, Chapter 25a, Criminal Justice and Substance 
Abuse, and Sections 62A-7-109,77-38a-302, and 77-27-6. State and local 
government agencies that serve victims have the duty to have a functional 
knowledge of the procedures established by the Utah Crime Victims' 
Reparations Board and to inform victims of these procedures. 
(f) Victims and witnesses have a right to have any personal property 
returned as provided in Sections 77-24-1 through 77-24-5. Criminal justice 
agencies shall expeditiously return the property when it is no longer 
needed for court law enforcement or prosecution purposes. 
(g) Victims and witnesses have the right to reasonable employer 
intercession services, including pursuing employer cooperation in 
minimizing employees' loss of pay and other benefits resulting from their 
participation in the criminal justice process. Officers of the court shall 
provide these services and shall consider victims' and witnesses' schedules 
so that activities which conflict can be avoided. Where conflicts cannot be 
avoided, the victim may request that the responsible agency intercede with 
employers or other parties. 
(h) Victims and witnesses, particularly children, should have a speedy 
disposition of the entire criminal justice process. All involved public 
agencies shall establish policies and procedures to encourage speedy 
disposition of criminal cases. 
(i) Victims and witnesses have the right to timely notice of judicial 
proceedings they are to attend and timely notice of cancellation of any 
proceedings. Criminal justice agencies have the duty to provide these 
notifications. Defense counsel and others have the duty to provide timely 
notice to prosecution of any continuances or other changes that may be 
required. 
(j) Victims of sexual offenses have a right to be informed of their right to 
request voluntary testing for themselves for HIV infection as provided in 
Section 76-5-503 and to request mandatory testing of the convicted sexual 
offender for HIV infection as provided in Section 76-5-502. The law 
enforcement office where the sexual offense is reported shall have the 
responsibility to inform victims of this right. 
(2) Informational rights of the victim under this chapter are based upon 
the victim providing his current address and telephone number to the 
criminal justice agencies involved in the case. 
77-37-4. Additional rights - Children. 
In addition to all rights afforded to victims and witnesses under this 
chapter, child victims and witnesses shall be afforded these rights: 
(1) Children have the right to protection from physical and emotional 
abuse during their involvement with the criminal justice process. 
(2) Children are not responsible for inappropriate behavior adults 
commit against them and have the right not to be questioned, in any 
manner, nor to have allegations made, implying this responsibility. Those 
who interview children have the responsibility to consider the interests of 
the child in this regard. 
(3) Child victims and witnesses have the right to have interviews 
relating to a criminal prosecution kept to a minimum. All agencies shall 
coordinate interviews and ensure that they are conducted by persons 
sensitive to the needs of children. 
(4) Child victims have the right to be informed of available community 
resources that might assist them and how to gain access to those resources. 
Law enforcement and prosecutors have the duty to ensure that child 
victims are informed of community resources, including counseling prior 
to the court proceeding, and have those services available throughout the 
criminal justice process. 
77-37-5. Remedies - Victims' Rights Committee. 
(1) In each judicial district, the presiding district court judge shall appoint a 
person who shall establish and chair a victims' rights committee consisting 
of: 
(a) a county attorney or district attorney; 
(b) a sheriff; 
(c) a corrections field services administrator; 
(d) an appointed victim advocate; 
(e) a municipal attorney; 
(f) a municipal chief of police; and 
(g) other representatives as appropriate. 
(2) The committee shall meet at least semiannually to review progress and 
problems related to this chapter, Title 77, Chapter 38, Rights of Crime 
Victims Act, and Utah Constitution Article I, Section 28. Victims and other 
interested parties may submit matters of concern to the victims' rights 
committee. The committee may hold a hearing open to the public on any 
appropriate matter of concern and may publish its findings. These matters 
shall also be considered at the meetings of the victims' rights committee. 
The committee shall forward minutes of all meetings to the Commission on 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice and the Office of Crime Victim Reparations 
for review and other appropriate action. 
(3) If a victims' rights committee is unable to resolve a complaint, it may 
refer the complaint to the Utah Council on Victims of Crime, established in 
Section 63-25a-601, for further consideration. 
(4) The Office of Crime Victim Reparations shall provide materials to local 
law enforcement to inform every victim of a sexual offense of the right to 
request testing of the convicted sexual offender and of the victim as 
provided in Section 76-5-502. 
(5) If a person acting under color of state law willfully or wantonly fails 
to perform duties so that the rights in this chapter are not provided, an 
action for injunctive relief may be brought against the individual and the 
government entity that employs the individual. The failure to provide the 
rights in this chapter or Title 77, Chapter 38, Rights of Crime Victims Act, 
does not constitute cause for a judgment against the state or any 
government entity, or any individual employed by the state or any 
government entity, for monetary damages, attorney's fees, or the costs of 
exercising any rights under this chapter. 
(6) The person accused of and subject to prosecution for the crime or the 
act which would be a crime if committed by a competent adult, has no 
standing to make a claim concerning any violation of the provisions of this 
chapter. 
Rights of Crime Victims Act (1994) 
77-38-1. Title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Rights of Crime 
Victims Act." 
77-38-2. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this chapter and the Utah Constitution: 
(1) "Abuse" means treating the crime victim in a manner so as to injure, 
damage, or disparage. 
(2) "Dignity" means treating the crime victim with worthiness, honor, 
and esteem. 
(3) "Fairness" means treating the crime victim reasonably, even-
handedly, and impartially. 
(4) "Harassment" means treating the crime victim in a persistently 
annoying manner. 
(5) "Important criminal justice hearings" or "important juvenile justice 
hearings" means the following proceedings in felony criminal cases or 
cases involving a minor's conduct which would be a felony if committed by 
an adult: 
(a) any preliminary hearing to determine probable cause; 
(b) any court arraignment where practical; 
(c) any court proceeding involving the disposition of charges against a 
defendant or minor or the delay of a previously scheduled trial date but 
not including any unanticipated proceeding to take an admission or a plea 
of guilty as charged to all charges previously filed or any plea taken at an 
initial appearance; 
(d) any court proceeding to determine whether to release a defendant or 
minor and, if so, under what conditions release may occur, excluding any 
such release determination made at an initial appearance; 
(e) any criminal or delinquency trial, excluding any actions at the trial 
that a court might take in camera, in chambers, or at a sidebar conference; 
(f) any court proceeding to determine the disposition of a minor or 
sentence, fine, or restitution of a defendant or to modify any disposition of 
a minor or sentence, fine, or restitution of a defendant; and 
(g) any public hearing concerning whether to grant a defendant or 
minor parole or other form of discretionary release from confinement. 
(6) "Reliable information" means information worthy of confidence, 
including any information whose use at sentencing is permitted by the 
United States Constitution. 
(7) "Representative of a victim" means a person who is designated by the 
victim or designated by the court and who represents the victim in the best 
interests of the victim. 
(8) "Respect" means treating the crime victim with regard and value. 
(9) (a) "Victim of a crime" means any natural person against whom the 
charged crime or conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted 
by the defendant or minor personally or as a party to the offense or 
conduct or, in the discretion of the court, against whom a related crime or 
act is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted, unless the natural 
person is the accused or appears to be accountable or otherwise criminally 
responsible for or criminally involved in the crime or conduct or a crime or 
act arising from the same conduct, criminal episode, or plan as the crime is 
defined under the laws of this state. 
(b) For purposes of the right to be present, "victim of a crime" does not 
mean any person who is in custody as a pretrial detainee, as a prisoner 
following conviction for an offense, or as a juvenile who has committed an 
act that would be an offense if committed by an adult, or who is in custody 
for mental or psychological treatment. 
(c) For purposes of the right to be present and heard at a public hearing 
as provided in Subsection 77-38-2(5) (g) and the right to notice as provided 
in Subsection 77-38-3(7)(a), "victim of a crime" includes any victim 
originally named in the allegation of criminal conduct who is not a victim 
of the offense to which the defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty. 
77-38-3. Notification to victims — Initial notice, election to receive 
subsequent notices — Form of notice - Protected victim information. 
(1) Within seven days of the filing of felony criminal charges against a 
defendant, the prosecuting agency shall provide an initial notice to 
reasonably identifiable and locatable victims of the crime contained in the 
charges, except as otherwise provided in this chapter. 
(2) The initial notice to the victim of a crime shall provide information 
about electing to receive notice of subsequent important criminal justice 
hearings listed in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) and rights under 
this chapter. 
(3) The prosecuting agency shall provide notice to a victim of a crime for 
the important criminal justice hearings, provided in Subsections 77-38-
2(5)(a) through (f) which the victim has requested. 
(4) (a) The responsible prosecuting agency may provide initial and 
subsequent notices in any reasonable manner, including telephonically, 
electronically, orally, or by means of a letter or form prepared for this 
purpose. 
(b) In the event of an unforeseen important criminal justice hearing, 
listed in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) for which a victim has 
requested notice, a good faith attempt to contact the victim by telephone 
shall be considered sufficient notice, provided that the prosecuting agency 
subsequently notifies the victim of the result of the proceeding. 
(5) (a) The court shall take reasonable measures to ensure that its 
scheduling practices for the proceedings provided in Subsections 77-38-
2(5)(a) through (f) permit an opportunity for victims of crimes to be 
notified. 
(b) The court shall also consider whether any notification system that it 
might use to provide notice of judicial proceedings to defendants could be 
used to provide notice of those same proceedings to victims of crimes. 
(6) A defendant or, if it is the moving party, Adult Probation and Parole, 
shall give notice to the responsible prosecuting agency of any motion for 
modification of any determination made at any of the important criminal 
justice hearings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) in 
advance of any requested court hearing or action so that the prosecuting 
agency may comply with its notification obligation. 
(7) (a) Notice to a victim of a crime shall be provided by the Board of 
Pardons and Parole for the important criminal justice hearing provided in 
Subsection 77-38-2(5)(g). 
(b) The board may provide notice in any reasonable manner, including 
telephonically, electronically, orally, or by means of a letter or form 
prepared for this purpose. 
(8) Prosecuting agencies and the Board of Pardons and Parole are 
required to give notice to a victim of a crime for the proceedings provided 
in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(a) through (f) only where the victim has 
responded to the initial notice, requested notice of subsequent proceedings, 
and provided a current address and telephone number if applicable. 
(9) (a) Law enforcement and criminal justice agencies shall refer any 
requests for notice or information about crime victim rights from victims to 
the responsible prosecuting agency. 
(b) In a case in which the Board of Pardons and Parole is involved, the 
responsible prosecuting agency shall forward any request for notice that it 
has received from a victim to the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(10) In all cases where the number of victims exceeds ten, the 
responsible prosecuting agency may send any notices required under this 
chapter in its discretion to a representative sample of the victims. 
(11) (a) A victim's address, telephone number, and victim impact 
statement maintained by a peace officer, prosecuting agency, Youth Parole 
Authority, Division of Juvenile Justice Services, Department of Corrections, 
and Board of Pardons and Parole, for purposes of providing notice under 
this section, is classified as protected as provided in Subsection 63-2-
304(10). 
(b) The victim's address, telephone number, and victim impact 
statement is available only to the following persons or entities in the 
performance of their duties: 
(i) a law enforcement agency, including the prosecuting agency; 
(ii) a victims' right committee as provided in Section 77-37-5; 
(iii) a governmentally sponsored victim or witness program; 
(iv) the Department of Corrections; 
(v) Office of Crime Victims' Reparations; 
(vi) Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice; and 
(vii) the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(12) The notice provisions as provided in this section do not apply to 
misdemeanors as provided in Section 77-38-5 and to important juvenile 
justice hearings as provided in Section 77-38-2. 
77-38-4. Right to be present and to be heard — Control of disruptive 
acts or irrelevant statements — Statements from persons in custody. 
(1) The victim of a crime shall have the right to be present at the 
important criminal or juvenile justice hearings provided in Subsections 77-
38-2(5)(a) through (f), the right to be heard at the important criminal or 
juvenile justice hearings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(b), (c), (d), and 
(f), and, upon request to the judge hearing the matter, the right to be 
present and heard at the initial appearance of the person suspected of 
committing the conduct or criminal offense against the victim on issues 
relating to whether to release a defendant or minor and, if so, under what 
conditions release may occur. 
(2) This chapter shall not confer any right to the victim of a crime to be 
heard: 
(a) at any criminal trial, including the sentencing phase of a capital trial 
under Section 76-3-207 or at any preliminary hearing, unless called as a 
witness; and 
(b) at any delinquency trial or at any preliminary hearing in a minor's 
case, unless called as a witness. 
(3) The right of a victim or representative of a victim to be present at 
trial is subject to Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall deprive the court of the right to prevent 
or punish disruptive conduct nor give the victim of a crime the right to 
engage in disruptive conduct. 
(5) The court shall have the right to limit any victim's statement to 
matters that are relevant to the proceeding. 
(6) In all cases where the number of victims exceeds five, the court may 
limit the in-court oral statements it receives from victims in its discretion to 
a few representative statements. 
(7) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a victim's right to be 
heard may be exercised at the victim's discretion in any appropriate 
fashion, including an oral, written, audiotaped, or videotaped statement or 
direct or indirect information that has been provided to be included in any 
presentence report. 
(8) If the victim of a crime is a person who is in custody as a pretrial 
detainee, as a prisoner following conviction for an offense, or as a juvenile 
who has committed an act that would be an offense if committed by an 
adult, or who is in custody for mental or psychological treatment, the right 
to be heard under this chapter shall be exercised by submitting a written 
statement to the court. 
(9) The court may exclude any oral statement from a victim on the 
grounds of the victim's incompetency as provided in Rule 601(a) of Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
(10) Except in juvenile court cases, the Constitution may not be 
construed as limiting the existing rights of the prosecution to introduce 
evidence in support of a capital sentence. 
77-38-5. Application to felonies and misdemeanors of the declaration 
of the rights of crime victims. 
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to: 
(1) any felony filed in the courts of the state; 
(2) to any class A and class B misdemeanor filed in the courts of the 
state; and 
(3) to cases in the juvenile court as provided in Section 78-3a-115. 
77-38-6. Victim's right to privacy. 
(1) The victim of a crime has the right, at any court proceeding, 
including any juvenile court proceeding, not to testify regarding the 
victim's address, telephone number, place of employment, or other locating 
information unless the victim specifically consents or the court orders 
disclosure on finding that a compelling need exists to disclose the 
information. A court proceeding on whether to order disclosure shall be in 
camera. 
(2) A defendant may not compel any witness to a crime, at any court 
proceeding, including any juvenile court proceeding, to testify regarding 
the witness's address, telephone number, place of employment, or other 
locating information unless the witness specifically consents or the court 
orders disclosure on finding that a compelling need for the information 
exists. A court proceeding on whether to order disclosure shall be in 
camera. 
77-38-7. Victim's right to a speedy trial. 
(1) In determining a date for any criminal trial or other important 
criminal or juvenile justice hearing, the court shall consider the interests of 
the victim of a crime to a speedy resolution of the charges under the same 
standards that govern a defendant's or minor's right to a speedy trial. 
(2) The victim of a crime has the right to a speedy disposition of the 
charges free from unwarranted delay caused by or at the behest of the 
defendant or minor and to prompt and final conclusion of the case after the 
disposition or conviction and sentence, including prompt and final 
conclusion of all collateral attacks on dispositions or criminal judgments. 
(3) (a) In ruling on any motion by a defendant or minor to continue a 
previously established trial or other important criminal or juvenile justice 
hearing, the court shall inquire into the circumstances requiring the delay 
and consider the interests of the victim of a crime to a speedy disposition of 
the case. 
(b) If a continuance is granted, the court shall enter in the record the 
specific reason for the continuance and the procedures that have been 
taken to avoid further delays. 
77-38-8. Age-appropriate language at judicial proceedings — Advisor. 
(1) In any criminal proceeding or juvenile court proceeding regarding or 
involving a child, examination and cross-examination of a victim or 
witness 13 years of age or younger shall be conducted in age-appropriate 
language. 
(2) (a) The court may appoint an advisor to assist a witness 13 years of 
age or younger in understanding questions asked by counsel. 
(b) The advisor is not required to be an attorney. 
77-38-9. Representative of victim — Court designation — 
Representation in cases involving minors — Photographs in homicide 
cases. 
(1) (a) A victim of a crime may designate, with the approval of the court, 
a representative who may exercise the same rights that the victim is 
entitled to exercise under this chapter. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the victim may revoke 
the designation at any time. 
(c) In cases where the designation is in question, the court may require 
that the designation of the representative be made in writing by the victim. 
(2) In cases in which the victim is deceased or incapacitated, upon 
request from the victim's spouse, parent, child, or close friend, the court 
shall designate a representative or representatives of the victim to exercise 
the rights of a victim under this chapter on behalf of the victim. The 
responsible prosecuting agency may request a designation to the court. 
(3) (a) If the victim is a minor, the court in its discretion may allow the 
minor to exercise the rights of a victim under this chapter or may allow the 
victim's parent or other immediate family member to act as a 
representative of the victim. 
(b) The court may also, in its discretion, designate a person who is not a 
member of the immediate family to represent the interests of the minor. 
(4) The representative of a victim of a crime shall not be: 
(a) the accused or a person who appears to be accountable or otherwise 
criminally responsible for or criminally involved in the crime or conduct, a 
related crime or conduct, or a crime or act arising from the same conduct, 
criminal episode, or plan as the crime or conduct is defined under the laws 
of this state; 
(b) a person in the custody of or under detention of federal, state, or 
local authorities; or 
(c) a person whom the court in its discretion considers to be otherwise 
inappropriate. 
(5) Any notices that are to be provided to a victim pursuant to this 
chapter shall be sent to the victim or the victim's lawful representative. 
(6) On behalf of the victim, the prosecutor may assert any right to which 
the victim is entitled under this chapter, unless the victim requests 
otherwise or exercises his own rights. 
(7) In any homicide prosecution, the prosecution may introduce a 
photograph of the victim taken before the homicide to establish that the 
victim was a human being, the identity of the victim, and for other relevant 
purposes. 
77-38-10. Victim's discretion. 
(1) (a) The victim may exercise any rights under this chapter at his 
discretion to be present and to be heard at a court proceeding, including a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding. 
(b) The absence of the victim at the court proceeding does not preclude 
the court from conducting the proceeding. 
(2) A victim shall not refuse to comply with an otherwise lawful 
subpoena under this chapter. 
(3) A victim shall not prevent the prosecution from complying with 
requests for information within a prosecutor's possession and control 
under this chapter. 
77-38-11. Enforcement — Appellate Review — No right to money 
damages. 
(1) If a person acting under color of state law willfully or wantonly fails 
to perform duties so that the rights in this chapter are not provided, an 
action for injunctive relief, including prospective injunctive relief, may be 
brought against the individual and the governmental entity that employs 
the individual. 
(2) (a) The victim of a crime or representative of a victim of a crime, 
including any Victims' Rights Committee as defined in Section 77-37-5 
may: 
(i) bring an action for declaratory relief or for a writ of mandamus 
defining or enforcing the rights of victims and the obligations of 
government entities under this chapter; and 
(ii) petition to file an amicus brief in any court in any case affecting 
crime victims. 
(b) Adverse rulings on these actions or on a motion or request brought 
by a victim of a crime or a representative of a victim of a crime may be 
appealed under the rules governing appellate actions, provided that no 
appeal shall constitute grounds for delaying any criminal or juvenile 
proceeding. 
(c) An appellate court shall review all such properly presented issues, 
including issues that are capable of repetition but would otherwise evade 
review. 
(3) The failure to provide the rights in this chapter or Title 77, Chapter 
37, Victims Rights, shall not constitute cause for a judgment against the 
state or any government entity, or any individual employed by the state or 
any government entity, for monetary damages, attorneys' fees, or the costs 
of exercising any rights under this chapter. 
77-38-12. Construction of this chapter — No right to set aside conviction, 
adjudication, admission, or plea — Severability clause. 
(1) All of the provisions contained in this chapter shall be construed to 
assist the victims of crime. 
(2) This chapter may not be construed as creating a basis for dismissing 
any criminal charge or delinquency petition, vacating any adjudication or 
conviction, admission or plea of guilty or no contest, or for appellate, 
habeas corpus, except in juvenile cases, or other relief from a judgment in 
any criminal or delinquency case. 
(3) This chapter may not be construed as creating any right of a victim to 
appointed counsel at state expense. 
(4) All of the rights contained in this chapter shall be construed to 
conform to the Constitution of the United States. 
(5) (a) In the event that any portion of this chapter is found to violate the 
Constitution of the United States, the remaining provisions of this chapter 
shall continue to operate in full force and effect. 
(b) In the event that a particular application of any portion of this 
chapter is found to violate the Constitution of the United States, all other 
applications shall continue to operate in full force and effect. 
(6) The enumeration of certain rights for crime victims in this chapter 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage other rights granted by the 
Utah Constitution or the Legislature or retained by victims of crimes. 
77-38-13. Declaration of legislative authority. 
It is the view of the Legislature that the provisions of this chapter, and 
other provisions enacted simultaneously with it, are substantive provisions 
within inherent legislative authority. In the event that any of the provisions 
of this chapter, and other provisions enacted simultaneously with it, are 
interpreted to be procedural in nature, the Legislature also intends to 
invoke its powers to modify procedural rules under the Utah Constitution. 
77-38-14. Notice of expungement petition — Victim's right to object. 
(1) The Department of Corrections or the Juvenile Probation Department 
shall prepare a document explaining the right of a victim or a victim's 
representative to object to a petition for expungement under Section 77-18-
11 or 78-3a-905 and the procedures for obtaining notice of any such 
petition. The department or division shall also provide each trial court a 
copy of the document which has jurisdiction over delinquencies or criminal 
offenses subject to expungement. 
(2) The prosecuting attorney in any case leading to a conviction or an 
adjudication subject to expungement shall provide a copy of the document 
to each person who would be entitled to notice of a petition for 
expungement under Sections 77-18-11 and 78-3a-905. 
Crime Victims Restitution Act (2001) 
77-38a-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Crime Victims Restitution Act." 
77-38a-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to 
conviction on the condition that a defendant agree to participate in a 
rehabilitation program, make restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other 
condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in 
a prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, 
whether or not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal 
activities and includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and 
medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain 
and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the 
prosecution and defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions 
and criminal charges upon which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the 
prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest 
from the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction 
against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply 
with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into 
between the prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms 
and conditions upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the 
court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in 
abeyance agreement, or any agreement by which the defendant may enter 
a plea in any other jurisdiction or where charges are dismissed without a 
plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest 
from the time of sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment 
of a reward, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for 
extradition or transportation and as may be further defined by law. 
(12) (a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and 
conviction of an offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this 
information, except that the person receiving the payment may not be a 
codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum 
offered to the public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to 
terminate investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a 
prosecution that has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be 
diverted. 
(14) (a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
77-38a-201. Restitution determination — Law enforcement duties and 
responsibilities. 
Any law enforcement agency conducting an investigation for criminal 
conduct which would constitute a felony or class A misdemeanor shall 
provide in the investigative reports whether a claim for restitution exists, 
the basis for the claim, and the estimated or actual amount of the claim. 
77-38a-202. Restitution determination — Prosecution duties and 
responsibilities. 
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of 
a felony or class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, 
municipal attorney, or district attorney shall provide to the district court: 
(a) the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for 
restitution; 
(b) the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; 
and 
(c) whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution 
specified as part of the plea disposition. 
(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general, 
county attorney, municipal attorney, or district attorney shall: 
(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing 
restitution amounts; and 
(b) in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction 
or plea disposition all claims for restitution arising out of the investigation 
for which the defendant is charged. 
(3) If charges are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, 
restitution claims from victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the 
court. 
77-38a-203. Restitution determination — Department of Corrections — 
Presentence investigation. 
(1) (a) The department shall prepare a presentence investigation report 
in accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(5). The prosecutor and law 
enforcement agency involved shall provide all available victim information 
to the department upon request. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify all victims of the offense; 
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the 
offense; 
(iii) include for each identifiable victim a specific statement of the 
recommended amount of complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-
302, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding 
the payment by the defendant of court-ordered restitution with interest as 
defined in Section 77-38a-302; 
(iv) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered by the 
victim as a result of the offense, and the seriousness and permanence; 
(v) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(vi) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vii) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense 
upon the victim or the victim's family that the court requires. 
(b) The crime victim shall be responsible to provide to the department 
upon request all invoices, bills, receipts, and other evidence of injury, loss 
of earnings, and out-of-pocket loss. The crime victim shall also provide 
upon request: 
(i) all documentation and evidence of compensation or reimbursement 
from insurance companies or agencies of the state of Utah, any other state, 
or federal government received as a direct result of the crime for injury, 
loss, earnings, or out-of-pocket loss; and 
(ii) proof of identification, including date of birth, Social Security 
number, drivers license number, next of kin, and home and work address 
and telephone numbers. 
(c) The inability, failure, or refusal of the crime victim to provide all or 
part of the requested information shall result in the court determining 
restitution based on the best information available. 
(2) (a) The court shall order the defendant as part of the presentence 
investigation to submit to the department any information determined 
necessary to be disclosed for the purpose of ascertaining the restitution. 
(b) The willful failure or refusal of the defendant to provide all or part of 
the requisite information shall constitute a waiver of any grounds to appeal 
or seek future amendment or alteration of the restitution order predicated 
on the undisclosed information. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution recommended in the presentence investigation, the court 
shall set a hearing date to resolve the matter. 
(d) If any party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence 
investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be 
considered to be waived. 
77-38a-301. Restitution — Convicted defendant may be required to pay. 
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to 
make restitution. 
77-38a-302. Restitution criteria. 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as 
provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed 
to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, 
a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in 
detennining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the 
criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a 
victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having 
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal 
sentence at the time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or 
inappropriate under this part, the court shall make the reasons for the 
decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the 
issue. 
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the 
offense shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to 
the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or 
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical 
care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing 
recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are 
lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that 
were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current 
employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections 
(5) (a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment 
of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the 
defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis 
or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make 
restitution inappropriate. 
(d) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall 
determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall 
make all restitution orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise 
within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court 
within one year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of 
Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after 
sentencing, refer an order of judgment and commitment back to the court 
for determination of restitution. 
77-38a-401. Entry of judgment — Interest — Civil actions - Lien. 
(1) Upon the court determining that a defendant owes restitution, the 
clerk of the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Section 77-38a-302 on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the 
order to the parties. 
(2) The order shall be considered a legal judgment, enforceable under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the department may, on 
behalf of the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce 
the restitution order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(3) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution 
and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of the order by 
civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's 
fees. 
(4) A judgment ordering restitution when recorded in a registry of 
judgments docket shall have the same affect and is subject to the same rules 
as a judgment in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered 
from the time of sentencing, including prejudgment interest. 
(5) The department shall make rules permitting the restitution payments 
to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to 
interest in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. 
77-38a-402. Nondischargeability in bankruptcy. 
Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in 
accordance with Subsection 77-38a-401(4) is considered a debt and may not 
be discharged in bankruptcy. 
77-38a-403. Civil action by victim for damages. 
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair 
the right of a person injured by a defendant's mrninal activities to sue and 
recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the 
defendant has paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part may 
not be introduced in any civil action arising out of the facts or events which 
were the basis for the restitution. However, the court shall credit any 
restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment in favor 
of the victim in the civil action. 
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a 
defendant's liability for pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is 
conclusively determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a 
subsequent civil action. 
77-38a-404. Priority. 
(1) Restitution payments made pursuant to a court order shall be 
disbursed to victims within 60 days of receipt from the defendant by the 
court or department: 
(a) provided the victim has complied with Subsection 77-38a-203(l)(b); 
and 
(b) if the defendant has tendered a negotiable instrument, funds from 
the financial institution are actually received. 
(2) If restitution to more than one person, agency, or entity is required at 
the same time, the department shall establish the following priorities of 
payment, except as provided in Subsection (4): 
(a) the crime victim; 
(b) the Office of Crime Victim Reparations; 
(c) any other government agency which has provided reimbursement to 
the victim as a result of the offender's criminal conduct; 
(d) the person, entity, or governmental agency that has offered and paid 
a reward under Section 76-3-201.1 or 78-3a-118; 
(e) any insurance company which has provided reimbursement to the 
victim as a result of the offender's criminal conduct; and 
(f) any county correctional facility to which the defendant is required to 
pay restitution under Subsection 76-3-201(6). 
(3) Restitution ordered under Subsection (2)(f) is paid after criminal 
fines and surcharges are paid. 
(4) If the offender is required under Section 53-10-404 to reimburse the 
department for the cost of obtaining the offender's DNA specimen, this 
reimbursement is the next priority after restitution to the crime victim 
under Subsection (2)(a). 
(5) All money collected for court-ordered obligations from offenders by 
the department will be applied: 
(a) first, to victim restitution, except the current and past due amount of 
$30 per month required to be collected by the department under Section 64-
13-21, if applicable; and 
(b) second, if applicable, to the cost of obtaining a DNA specimen under 
Subsection (4). 
(6) Restitution owed to more than one victim shall be disbursed to each 
victim according to the percentage of each victim's share of the total 
restitution order. 
77-38a-501. Default and sanctions. 
(1) When a defendant defaults in the payment of a judgment for 
restitution or any installment ordered, the court, on motion of the 
prosecutor, parole or probation agent, victim, or on its own motion may 
impose sanctions against the defendant as provided in Section 76-3-201.1. 
(2) The court may not impose a sanction against the defendant under 
Subsection (1) if: 
(a) the defendant's sole default in the payment of a judgement for 
restitution is the failure to pay restitution ordered under Subsection 76-3-
201(6) regarding costs of incarceration in a county correctional facility; and 
(b) the sanction would extend the defendant's term of probation or 
parole. 
77-38a-502. Collection from inmate offenders. 
In addition to the remedies provided in Section 77-38a-501, the 
department upon written request of the prosecutor, victim, or parole or 
probation agent, shall collect restitution from offender funds held by the 
department as provided in Section 64-13-23. 
77-38a-601. Preservation of assets. 
(1) At the time a criminal information, indictment charging a violation, 
or a petition alleging delinquency is filed, or at any time during the 
prosecution of the case, a prosecutor may petition the court to enter a 
restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory 
performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of 
property which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order 
if, in the prosecutor's best judgement, there is a substantial likelihood that a 
conviction will be obtained and restitution will be ordered. 
(a) Upon receiving a petition from a prosecutor under this Subsection 
(1), and after notice and a hearing, the court may enter a restraining order 
or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or 
take any action necessary to preserve the availability of property which 
may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order. 
(b) An order entered under this Subsection (1) is effective for up to 90 
days, unless extended by the court for good cause shown. 
(2) Prior to the filing of a criminal information, indictment charging a 
violation, or a petition alleging delinquency, a prosecutor may petition the 
court to enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a 
satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the 
availability of property which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated 
restitution order if, in the prosecutor's best judgement, there is a substantial 
likelihood that a conviction will be obtained and restitution will be 
ordered. 
(a) Upon receiving a request from a prosecutor under this Subsection (2), 
the court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution 
of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any action necessary to 
preserve the availability of property which may be necessary to satisfy an 
anticipated restitution order after notice to persons appearing to have an 
interest in the property and affording them an opportunity to be heard, if 
the court determines that: 
(i) there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed 
and that the defendant committed it, and that failure to enter the order will 
result in the property being sold, distributed, exhibited, destroyed, or 
removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise be made 
unavailable for restitution; and 
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property or prevent its 
sale, distribution, exhibition, destruction, or removal through the entry of 
the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom 
the order is to be entered. 
(b) An order entered under this Subsection (2) is effective for the period 
of time given in the order. 
(3) (a) Upon receiving a request from a prosecutor under Subsection (2), 
and notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i), a court may enter a temporary 
restraining order against an owner with respect to specific property 
without notice or opportunity for a hearing if: 
(i) the prosecutor demonstrates that there is a substantial likelihood that 
the property with respect to which the order is sought appears to be 
necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order under this chapter; and 
(ii) that provision of notice would jeopardize the availability of the 
property to satisfy any restitution order or judgment. 
(b) The temporary order in this Subsection (3) expires not more than ten 
days after it is entered unless extended for good cause shown or the party 
against whom it is entered consents to an extension. 
(4) A hearing concerning an order entered under this section shall be 
held as soon as possible, and prior to the expiration of the temporary order. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 35. Victims and witnesses. 
(a) The prosecuting agency shall inform all victims and subpoenaed 
witnesses of their responsibilities during the criminal proceedings. 
(b) The prosecuting agency shall inform all victims and subpoenaed 
witnesses of their right to be free from threats, intimidation and harm by 
anyone seeking to induce the victim or witness to testify falsely, withhold 
testimony or information, avoid legal process, or secure the dismissal of or 
prevent the filing of a criminal complaint, indictment or information. 
(c) If requested by the victim, the prosecuting agency shall provide notice 
to all victims of the date and time of scheduled hearings, trial and 
sentencing and of their right to be present during those proceedings and 
any other public hearing unless they are subpoenaed to testify as a witness 
and the exclusionary rule is invoked. 
(d) The informational rights of victims and witnesses contained in 
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this rule are contingent upon their providing 
the prosecuting agency and court with their current telephone numbers 
and addresses. 
(e) In cases where the victim or the victim's legal guardian so requests, the 
prosecutor shall explain to the victim that a plea agreement involves the 
dismissal or reduction of charges in exchange for a plea of guilty and 
identify the possible penalties which may be imposed by the court upon 
acceptance of the plea agreement. At the time of entry of the plea, the 
prosecutor shall represent to the court, either in writing or on the record, 
that the victim has been contacted and an explanation of the plea bargain 
has been provided to the victim or the victim's legal guardian prior to the 
court's acceptance of the plea. If the victim or the victim's legal guardian 
has informed the prosecutor that he or she wishes to address the court at 
the change of plea or sentencing hearing, the prosecutor shall so inform the 
court. 
(f) The court shall not require victims and witnesses to state their addresses 
and telephone numbers in open court. 
(g) Judges should give scheduling priority to those criminal cases where 
the victim is a minor in an effort to minimize the emotional trauma to the 
victim. Scheduling priorities for cases involving minor victims are subject 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRANDON R. LANE, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 051800048 
Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on victims Patricia Hay's and 
Peggy Hay's (uthe victims") Motion to Set Aside Plea in Abeyance and 
for Evidentiary Hearing, filed August 03, 2006. On July 31, 2006, the 
Court convened a telephone conference. The Court requested that the 
parties brief the issue of whether the victims have standing to assert 
a motion to set aside the plea and a time frame for such briefing was 
established. On August 23, 2006, the victims filed a memorandum in 
support of the motion to set aside the plea. On September 11, 2006, 
the Defendant filed a reply memorandum in opposition to the motion. 
On October 23, 2006, the victims submitted a reply memorandum in 
support of the motion. The Court notes that this reply was siibmitted 
more than one month after the deadline established at the July 31 
telephone conference. The Court also notes that the Plaintiff has 
remained silent in the matter. Having considered the brief3, the 
Court now rules upon the issue of standing and upon the merits of the 
arguments presented in the briefs. 
I. STANDING 
After reviewing the matter, the Court finds that the victims have 
standing to file their motion. The Court finds standing, in part, due 
to the similarity of this case with State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, 44 
P.3d 756, which was cited by both parties. In Casey, the Supreme 
Court of Utah entertained an appeal by the mother of a victim of 
sexual abuse. While the Supreme Court did not directly discuss the 
issue of standing in Casey, the Supreme Court has stated that 
11
 standing [is] a threshold issue that must be determined before 
proceeding to further inquiries." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 
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UT 14, P8 (Utah 2004). From this Court's review of that decision, the 
Supreme Court presumed that the victim had standing to file the motion 
to set aside the plea. 
Due to the similarity of these cases, this Court will find that 
the victims have standing to assert a similar motion to set aside the 
plea. The Court feels confident that this is the correct course of 
action in light of the fact that the victims are seeking relief based 
upon constitutional and statutory rights, no other party has as great 
an interest in seeking to set aside the plea and to obtain review of 
this Court's restitution order, and no other party is seeking to raise 
these issues. The Court is particularly concerned that the victims be 
afforded the fairness, respect, and dignity contemplated by Section 2 8 
of Article I of the Constitution of Utah. Based upon the foregoing, 
the Court will rule that the victims have standing insofar as the 
victims are attempting to assert rights arising under the Utah 
Constitution and Utah Code. 
II. THE VICTIMS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE PLEA 
For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the motion to 
set aside the plea, but will convene a hearing for presentation of 
victim impact statements. 
A. RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AND HEARD 
The victims argue that Article I, Section 28 of the Utah 
Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4(1) grant victims a right to 
be present and heard at important criminal justice hearings. The 
victims argue that the September 12, 2005 status hearing, at which the 
plea in abeyance was entered, is a hearing at which they had a right 
to be present and heard. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(5) defines 
uimportant criminal justice hearings," for purposes of the Utah 
Constitution and for purposes of that chapter, as certain hearing 
related to felony proceedings (accord Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 
28(3)). Because this case has never involved any felonies, the Court 
is obligated to find that Utah constitutional and statutory law did 
not provide the victims with the right to be present and heard at the 
September 12, 2005 hearing. This finding is consistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's plain language interpretation of the relevant statutes 
in State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, 44 P.3d 756. 
That said, the Court, in an attempt to provide the victims with 
the fairness, respect, and dignity contemplated by the Utah 
Constitution, will schedule a hearing at which, should the victims 
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desire, victim impact statements may be presented. 
B. RESTITUTION 
After reviewing the memoranda, the Court is unable to determine 
the proper course of action to take as it relates to the issue of 
restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-3 (1) (e) states unequivocally that 
"Victims are entitled to restitution . * ." The procedure for 
determining the proper amount of restitution is outlined in Title 77 , 
Chapter 38a of the Utah Code. Having reviewed the procedures, and 
having reviewed the transcript from the September 12, 2005 hearing, 
the Court is concerned that the procedural requirements relating to 
the proper determination of restitution were not met. 
However, the State has agreed, as part of the plea in abeyance 
agreement, to not seek additional restitution for the events that 
transpired on February 19, 2005. There is no private cause of action 
that the Court has been made aware of for seeking restitution above 
and beyond that requested by the State, Further, the Defendant has 
indicated that the victims have entered into a settlement with the 
Defendant and the Defendant's insurer, which settlement bars any 
future claims against the Defendant. Because the State has agreed to 
not seek additional restitution, and because it appears that the 
victims cannot seek additional restitution from the Defendant, the 
Court cannot see how anyone is in a position to further enforce the 
victims1 right to restitution. Therefore, the Court will deny the 
victims' request for a restitution hearing. 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the 
victims have standing, but that IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the victims' 
motion is DENIED. The Court orders that a hearing be held at which 
the victims, if so desired, can present statements regarding the 
impact of the Defendant'3 actions on the victims' lives. The Court 
orders that the Defendant be present at the hearing. This is done to 
afford the victims the fairness, respect, and dignity contemplated by 
the Utah Constitution. 
Dated this *'* day of (Jt CX//) j , 2005. 
OfiM R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge 
3 of 3 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 051800048 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail ROBERT P FAUST 
ATTORNEY DEF 
4132 S 2300 E 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84124 
Mail HEIDI M NESTEL 
ATTORNEY 
2035 S 1300 E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
By Hand KAREN ALLEN 
Dated this \Qh day of NftKfhLif- . 20 (\h . 
&tK-
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
Addendum C 
JAMES H. FAUST - #1046 
Attorney for Defendant 
Williamsburg Office Park 
5806 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121-1644 
(801)892-0114 
(801) 892-0116 (FAX) 
RUED 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
NOV 0 *) 2007 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
BY_eda, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DUCHESNE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRANDON R. LANE, 
Defendant 
i 




GUELTY PLEA AND ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Case No. 051800048 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The above matter came before the court on Monday, August 27, 2007 before the above-
entitled court pursuant to Defendant Brandon Lane's Motion to Dismiss seeking an order setting 
aside the Defendant's guilty plea, Memoranda having been filed by Defendant's attorney, James 
H. Faust, and the Victims' advocate, Heidi Nestel, the court having heard oral argument, now 
enters into the following Findings of Fact and Order: 
BINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i. On or about September 12,2005, Defendant Brandon Lane pleaded guilty to two 
counts of misdemeanor negligent homicide, and twd counts of misdemeanor illegal lane change. 
Pursuant to the joint motions of both the defense and prosecution, this Court agreed to hold the 
pleas in abeyance as governed by the written plea in abeyance agreement. According to the 
terms set therein, Defendant agreed to commit no new violations of law for 12 months, pay a 
$1,500.00 plea in abeyance fee, complete 44 hours of community service and complete a 
defensive driving course. The Court then informed Defendant that if he performed all of these 
obligations, that at the expiration of 12 months the Court would allow Defendant to withdraw his 
guilty pleas and have the case dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Within the agreed 12-month period, Defendant fully performed each of his 
obligations imposed by the court and duly provided proof of the Defendant's compliance to this 
Court as well. 
3, Prior to the expiration of the 12 months, in August of 2006, surviving Victims 
Peggy and Patricia Hay, by and through counsel, filed a Motion to Set Aside the Plea in 
Abeyance. Subsequent to filing this motion, Victims filed a motion to stay the plea in abeyance 
period so that the parties could brief and argue Victims1 Motion to Set Aside the Plea in 
Abeyance. The Court granted the motion to stay the abeyance period so that Victims could be 
heard. 
4* In October of 2006, this Court, having received Victims' expansive brief and 
Defendant's opposition, denied Victims' Motion to Set Aside the Plea in Abeyance. However, 
the Court agreed to stay the abeyance period to allow Victims the opportunity to appeal this 
Court's denial of their motion. 
5. hi December of 2006, Victims filed their appeal with the Court of Appeals. 
& March 12, 2007 marked the passing of 18 months since this Court held the 
misdemeanor pleas in abeyance. 
i.\ Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(5) provides that "A plea shall not be held in abeyance 
longer than 18 months if the plea was to any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if 
2 
the plea was to any degree of felony or to any combitiation of misdemeanors and felonies." The 
Court finds that a plea to multiple misdemeanors held in abeyance can only be held for a period 
no longer than 18 months. 
8. Utah Code Ann. §77-38-1 l(2)(b) gives victims the right to appeal adverse rulings 
made by the trial court. However, this statute also explicitly states that no appeal "shall 
constitute grounds for delaying any criminal or juvenile proceeding." 
9. Victims1 failure, by and through counsel, to receive an order from an appellate 
court overturning the trial court's decision to deny Victims1 Motion to Set Aside the Plea In 
Abeyance Agreement within that eighteen month window of time amounts to a delay of the 
underlying case. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
That insofar as Utah law lacked jurisdiction, pursuant to State v. Schubarth. 2005 UT 
App. 166, to stay a plea in abeyance agreement beyond the statutory time limitation and under 
Utah Law - Utah Code Ann, §77-2a2(5) ~ the Court is prevented from holding multiple 
misdemeanor pleas in abeyance for longer than 18 months, the court hereby orders the dismissal 
of Defendant's guilty pleas, with prejudice. 
DATED this *% day of , 2007. 
BY lWc0mT: 
'OHN ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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KAREN ALLEN (7454) 
Duchesne County Attorney 
21554 West 9000 South 
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Duchesne, UT 84021 
Telephone: (435) 738-0184 
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ROBERT P. FAUST (39281 
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Telephone: (801) 278-9099 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ) 
BRANDON RAY LANE ] 
DOB: 08/16/1978 ] 
Defendant. ' 
> PLEA IN ABEYANCE AGREEMENT 
I Case No. 05-1800048 
1 Judge John R. Anderson 
This Plea in Abeyance Agreement is made and entered into this />?f^  day of 
Sxft-^Vefl^ . 2005, by the between the Plaintiff, State of Utah, through its attorney, Karen 
Allen, and the Defendant, Brandon Ray Lane and his attorney of record, Robert P. Faust, in the 
above-entitled action, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-2a-l through 4. 
IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
SEP I 2 2005 
JOANhEMcKEE, CLERK 
BV
 feV ..PEPUTY 
MfMd 
1. The State agrees it will not bring any other charges ot actions for restitution against 
Defendant for his activities described in the Summons/Infonnation or for the events related to 
automobile accident of February 19,2005. 
2. Defendant shall plead guilty to two counts of Negligent Homicide, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-5-206 (1953), and to two Class C 
Misdemeanors in violation of Section 41-6a-706 (1) and violation of Section 41-6a-706 (2), as 
amended, and the State shall make a Motion that Defendant's pleas of guilty be held in abeyance 
for a period of twelve (12) months, 
3. Defendant acknowledges that he will plead guilty to two counts of Negligent Homicide, a 
Class A Misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-5-206 (1953), as amended and two 
Class C Misdemeanors in violation of Section 41-6a-706 (1) and (2) as amended, if the Judge 
indicates he will accept this plea in abeyance. Defendant further acknowledges that each Class A 
Misdemeanor carries a maximum sentence of not more than 1 year imprisonment and a $2,500 
fine (plus an 85% surcharge under Utah Code Ann* §63-63a-l) and each Class C Misdemeanor 
carries a maximum sentence of not more than ninety days imprisonment and a $750.00 fine (plus 
an 85% surcharge under Utah Code Ann. §63-63a-l). 
4* Defendant acknowledges that by pleading guilty, he is admitting each element of the 
offenses, 
5. Defendant acknowledges that he understands that by pleading guilty he waives or gives 
up the following rights: 
a> The right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury; 
b> The right to voluntarily testify in his own defense; 
<t The right against self incrimination at his own trial and the right not to be 
compelled by the court to testify if he chooses to remain silent; 
d> The right to confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses whom the 
prosecution calls to testify against him; 
e. The right to have his witnesses subpoenaed at the prosecution's expense to testify 
in his defense; 
& The right to put the prosecution to its burden of proving its case against him 
beyond a reasonable doubt; 
g, The right to appeal the decisions of the court or the jury; 
i 
L The right to retain his own attorney to represent him. He understands that if he 
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent him upon his request if he is 
indigent and that he could be sentenced to jail as a result of being convicted. 
6. Defendant acknowledges that he has discussed this matter with his attorney, and that he 
fully understands the terms of this agreement. 
7. Defendant's pleas of guilty are knowingly and voluntarily made, 
8. Defendant acknowledges that he knows and understands the nature and the elements of 
the offense to which he is entering the plea, and that said pleas are an admission of all those 
elements. The general facts are as follows: Defendant acknowledges that on ot about the date 
charged, he was traveling west bound on Highway 3R-40 (U3-40) near mile marker 70 
(approximately 15 miles west of Duchesne, UT) at 55 mph (Speed Limit was 65) and started to 
pass a semi tanker truck with a pup trailer and when he had reached the point of passing the pup 
trailer he saw a white jeep without headlights on and he turned to the left. The Jeep turned to the 
right and the two vehicles collided, which resulted in two fatalities. No drugs or alcohol was 
involved for either driver involved in the accident 
The facts of the case and the elements of the offense of Negligent Homicide are: 
That on or about February 19,2005 in Duchesne County, State of Utah, Defendant acting 
with criminal negligence caused the death of another. 
The facts of the case and elements of the Class C offenses are: 
Section 41-6a-706 (1): that on or about February 19,2005 in Duchesne County, State of 
Utah, Defendant operated a vehicle to the left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and 
passing another vehicle preceding the same direction when the left side was not clearly visible 
and not free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit overtaking and passing 
to be completed without interfering with the operation of any vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction of any vehicle overtaken. 
Section 4!-6a-706 (2): that on or about February 19,2005 in Duchesne County, State of 
Utah, Defendant while passing a semi truck was in passing in a lane authorized for vehicles 
approaching in the opposite direction and did not return to his authorized lane of travel before 
comiiig within 200 feet of the vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. 
9. Defendant is not under the influence of alcohol or drugs and no one has made any 
promises or threats to induce him to plead guilty or no contest 
10. Defendant acknowledges that his pleas will be held in abeyance for a period of twelve 
(12) months, subject to certain limitations and conditions imposed by the Court; and the Court 
will retain jurisdiction during said Abeyance period. The terms of the agreement are as follows: 
3 
a. Defendant will pay $1,500.00 to the Duchesne County Attorney's Office for the 
benefit of the victims' families. 
b. Defendant shall successfully complete an education and training course of at least 
eight hours duration on driving awareness. Defendant shall fully pay for the education 
course, and shall report his successful completion of the course to the clerk of court 
within the period his guilty plea is held in abeyance. 
c. Defendant shall perform forty (40) hours of community service at a public or 
charitable organization. 
d. Excluding non moving traffic violations, Defendant shall not violate any Utah 
state law or be convicted of the same, during the term of this Agreement 
e. Defendant shall appear before this Court for review whenever required by the 
Court. Any notices may be sent to Defendant at his residence: 2729 East 3625 South 
Vernal, UT 84078. Defendant shall provide to the clerk of court and to the Office of the 
Duchesne County Attorney any change of address or telephone number in writing, within 
ten days. 
f. Defendant's compliance with the terms of his plea abeyance shall not be 
monitored by the Adult Probation and Parole Department 
11. Defendant acknowledges that if he fails to live up to all the terms of this Agreement, the 
Court may accept the pleas of guilty and proceed to sentence Defendant pursuant to law and the 
sentences may run either concurrently or consecutively. 
12. Defendant acknowledges that by entering into this Agreement he knowingly waives the 
right to be sentenced within 30 days after the entry of the pleas. 
13* Defendant acknowledges having been advised that any request to withdraw his pleas of 
guilty must be made by motion, and is waived if not made within 30 days after entry of the pleas. 
14. The State shall make a Motion to the court to dismiss this action upon Defendant's 
completion of all of the conditions of this agreement, at which time the Court will allow 
Defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas and the Court will order dismissal of the case. 
15. Defendant acknowledges that he has read this document or this document has been read 
to him by another person and he knows and understands its contents and he adopts each one of 
the statements herein as his own, 
16. The parties acknowledge that the Court may enter an Order pursuant to the terms of this 
Agreement 
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Addendum E 
KAREN ALLEN (7454) 
Duchesne County Attorney 
21554 West 9000 South 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, UT 84021 
Telephone: (435) 738-0184 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ] 
BRANDON RAY LANE ] 
Defendant ] 
> ORDER 
l Case No. 05-1800048 
1 Judge John R, Anderson 
This matter came on for disposition hearing before the Honorable John Anderson on the 
/3/-k day of 5tpfc*4<<, 2005. The State of Utah was represented through its attorney, Karen 
Allen, and the Defendant, Brandon Ray Lane was present and represented by counsel, Robert P. 
Faust The Defendant entered guilty pleas to two counts of Negligence Homicide, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-5-206 (1953) and to two Class C 
Misdemeanors in violation of Section 41-6a-706 (1) and violation of Section 41-6a-706 (2), as 
amended, and the State of Utah made a Motion that the Defendant's guilty pleas be held in 
SEP 1 * 
jOAMNEjWffi,0! 
„. - « « 
abeyance for a period of twelve 12 months. The parties stipulated to the terms and conditions of 
the Plea in Abeyance Agreement in open court and the written agreement has been filed with the 
Court. The Court finds the Defendant pleas have been knowingly and voluntarily made pursuant 
to the Plea in Abeyance Agreement. Based upon Defendant's pleas of guilty, the written Plea in 
Abeyance Agreement on file herein, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendant's pleas of guilty are received and held in abeyance for a period of 12 months. 
2. The terms and conditions of said Plea in Abeyance are as follows; 
a. Defendant will pay $1,500.00 to theJQiii&esnaJ^lQj^^ forjhe 
benefit of the victims' families. 
b. Defendant shall successfully complete an education and training course of at least 
eight hours duration on driving awareness. Defendant shall fully pay for the education 
course, and shall report his successful completion of the course to the clerk of court 
within the period his guilty plea is held in abeyance. 
c. Defendant shall perform forty (40) hours of community service at a public or 
charitable organization. 
d. Excluding non moving traffic Violations, Defendant shall not violate any Utah 
state law or be convicted of the same, during the term of this Agreement 
e. Defendant shall appear before this Court for review whenever required by the 
Court. Any notices may be sent to Defendant at his residence: 2729 East 3625 South 
Vernal, UT 84078. Defendant shall provide to the Clerk of Court and to the Office of the 
Duchesne County Attorney any change of address or telephone number in writing, within 
ten days. 
f. Defendant's compliance with the terms of his plea abeyance shall not be 
monitored by the Adult Probation and Parole Department 
4, This Court shall retain continuing jurisdiction for the purposes of reviewing and 
modifying the conditions of the abeyance agreement and this Order, and in the event Defendant 
violates any of the terms of the agreement or this Order, the Defendant may be brought before 
the Court and the Court may accept Defendant's plea of guilty and impose sentence according to 
law. 
2 
5. Upon the Defendant completing all terms of the Plea in Abeyance Agreement to the 
Court's satisfaction, upon motion by the Plaintiff, the Defendant will be allowed to withdraw his 
guilty pleas and the Court will dismiss the case. 
^ 2005. 
k^V 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/^W /fe^ »J> 
ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
&1 
FAUJ ROBERT P. ST 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
The Court: Okay. You are Brandon R. Lane?-
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: What is your mailing address? 
The Defendant: 2729 East 3625 South, Vernal, Utah. 
The Court: Vernal? 
The Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: Okay. Okay. This is calendared for status, 
There was a first appearance hearing two weeks ago. Is this case 
settled or do you need - do we need to have a prelim? 
Mr. Faust: No. It is settled, your Honor. We have a 
plea agreement here - a plea in abeyance agreement -
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Faust: - that has been viewed and signed by all 
parties except for the defendant himself. 
The Court: Okay. Tell me what is proposed. 
Mr. Faust: What's proposed, your Honor, is is that the 
defendant is going to plead guilty to two counts of negligent 
homicide, a class A misdemeanor, and two counts of a class C 
misdemeanor, two different sections under the traffic code 
violation, which I can give you if you'd like, or they're 
contained in the agreement. They're going to be held in abeyance 
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dealt with separately. The lady that's got the million dollar 
damage, her insurance at this point has paid all but 50,000. 
That's still a great deal of money. So I'd like to leave the 
damage issue open. 
The Court: Is there liability insurance on him? Is 
there coverage? 
Mr. Faust: There is, your Honor. There's a $50,000 
policy and it's all been paid out. I have what's been paid out 
and to whom at this point. There will be no additional funds 
available. In addition, Mrs. Lane, the defendant's wife, was 
also injured in the automobile accident. She has waived any of 
her rights to any of the insurance proceeds - you know -
realistically a young married couple, they're in debt, they have 
little or no assets. This $1500 is what we were able to come up 
with in regards to what they could fit it in within their budget 
and faithfully and fully comply with. 
The Court: I guess there needs to be some kind of 
conclusion I guess as to an agreement to be bound or some future 
determination. We don't have that today, I guess. 
Ms. Allen: No. And I guess - we actually flew to 
Denver and met with the family and I believe at this point they 
would consider that a slap in the face more than they would what 
he's prooably trying to do which is make an attempt at 
restitution. 



















Ms. Allen: I just don't think we need $1500 in there 
now. 1 think we're going to have a ton of other money. And if 
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The Court: Would that make the family feel better? 
Ms. Allen: T'm sure it would. 
The Court: All. right. 
Mr. Faust: Well, we can interlineate as to where the 
funds are to go. 
Thi 
Mr. Faust: Yes, your Honor. 
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State prove to your jury beyond a reasonable doubt that they -
that you did what they allege. You could appeal if convicted. 
You could have some input with Mr. Faust in picking the jury of 
people that look good to you. You could have this done in a 
reasonably speedy time. You don't have to prove anything. The 
State has the burden of proof. I would instruct your jury that 
if any of them had a reasonable doubt they shouldn't vote to 
convict you. Those are the rights that you're giving up by 
entering into this plea in abeyance. Do you understand that? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: If you should not comply with the plea in 
abeyance or get in some kind of serious trouble during the 
interim of the next year you might find yourself in here being 
sentenced on the two class A's and the two class C s and you 
didn't get to have a trial. Do you understand that? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: It could result in a year in prison and a 
$2500 fine on each count. You understand that if you do what 
you're supposed to do that it will work to your advantage and 
we'11 allow you to withdraw your guilty plea and the case will be 
dismissed. But if you don't do what you're supposed to do the 
consequences will be you've entered this plea and you didn't get 
to have a trial. Do you understand that? 
The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
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broken ribs. I think she was up on her feet in a couple of 
months. The other lady is still in a wheelchair and is expected 
to be in therapy for some time. And she's the one who I told you 
her medical bills had run over a million dollars at this point. 
The Court: So factually, do you agree with the fact 
that that's basically what happened? 
The Defendant; Yes, sir. 
Mr. Faust: In addition, just for the record, Judge, 
there was no alcohol or drugs involved for either driver in the 
accident. 
The Court: Okay. You have a plea in abeyance agreement 
in front of you there. I'll have you sign off on that if you 
don't have any questions from Mr. Faust or me. 
Mr. Faust: May I approach? 
The Court: You may. 
Ms. Allen: Your Honor, I would also like it on the 
record that a member of the Sheriff's Department, the Victim's 
Advocate, and I did go out to Denver last week where we talked to 
- I think we talked to all the parties and their children and the 
people that were concerned in it so it's - concerned with it and 
they had a lot of concerns at first, but I think that they are 
good with this agreement. 
The Court: Okay. Thank you. 
Okay. Mr. Lane, do you have any questions? 
The Defendant: No, sir. 
1 _ i s e you that you must file d 
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3 unconditional right, but.you do x l< I In 
Now you'\e t diked about some cl=^s r ^i °de:r,can~r . emu 
^ a "he 
7 plea ii I abeyance agreement? 
8 • Mr. Faust: m~ ~v - -
9 the amending ^ w-iucili. ^e SCLLIUI^, if ; would . 
10 at paragraph i ; . page ? of the pi *=a- * ^  ' - -j -. - — — ^ * 
11 |on<= * - - -
12 6a-706 (2) . 
]1 . The Court: And s u b s t a n t i v e 1 • ' ? 
'. Mr. F a u s t : P a r a g r — u en pa^e ~i ; . > i f way Jc 
15 t h e page t h e f a c t u - l V «- ' s of t h o s e e l e m e n t s a r e c o n t a i n e d r i g h t 
]£ ( t h e r e nil ' > < ro paxa* _ - . . . . . . 
1 j The C o u r t : . ••. t o i.h---? c h a r g e c o n t a i n e d i n 
18 I t h e Amended I n f o r m a t : - loi in: i t 3 , C:i : :ii riri :ii i: i = 1! I loni :ii c:i de,- Neg] i gei I t: 







what i s your p i e 
Th D e f e n d ^ r i i : t.jij i 1 |. y . 
The C o u r t : Count !"„ C r i m i n a l Homicide , N e g l i g e n t 
Homicide/ a c l a s s A in! irlomerirn m n u, il »i i i 
i s your plea? 


























The Court: Count 3, Violation of a Passing Lane 
Violation, Section 41-63-706(1), what is your plea? 
The Defendant: Guilty. 
The Court: And to Count 4, a similar violation, what is 
your plea? 
The Defendant: Guilty. 
The Court: Those are class C misdemeanors. 
The Court will accept the plea, find there's a factual 
basis, find the defendant has been advised and knowingly waived 
his rights. I will not enter the plea. I will approve the plea 
in abeyance agreement as having been made in the interest of 
justice. I'll enter it now and it will be in effect for twelve 
months. The terms of the plea in abeyance agreement will be 
$1500 to the - as a plea in abeyance fee, a successful completion 
of an education and training course of at least eight hours on 
driving awareness, at your own expense. Forty hours community 
service at a public or charitable organization. Violate no 
laws. I won't violate you for non-moving traffic. Report here 
when ordered to do so. Notify us of any change of address. 
Maintain compliance with the terms of the plea in abeyance. 
There will not be any formal probation. The Court will retain 
jurisdiction. If you do what you're supposed to do and complete 
the terms as set forth we will allow you to withdraw your guilty 
pleas and the case will be dismissed. 

























monthly payment plan? 
The Defendant: I can probably pay it, yeah, as soon as 
possible. 
The Court: Well, all right. I'll accept a hundred a 
month if you want to do it that way, either way. 
The Defendant: Yeah, a hundred. 
Mr. Faust: To the Court or to the County Attorney's 
Office? 
The Court: It comes to the Court. 
M 
r. Faust: Okay. Thank you. 
The.Court: Okay. Mr. Lane, good luck. I hope you can 
work this out. 
The Defendant: Thank you. 
Mr. Faust: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon the foregoing proceedings were concluded.) 
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PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: Next case is Brandon Lane. State vs. 
Lane. 
MR. FAUST: Your Honor, my name is James Faust. I am 
Robert's older brother. 
MS. NESTEL: Your Honor, could I just introduce 
myself? I'm Heidi Nestel from the Victims. 
THE COURT: Yes. I'm reading your letter. 
MS. NESTEL: Okay. 
THE COURT: When is this case calendared for argument 
in the appellate court? 
MS. NESTEL: I called the appellate court on Friday. 
And it is scheduled right now for October 8th. I anticipate, 
it will be heard in October. Unfortunately, I do have plane 
tickets for Germany that week. But I will be available the 
second week of October. I'm hoping to get it scheduled that 
week. But it has been calendared. 
MR. FAUST: I haven't received any notification one 
way or the other. 
THE COURT: Okay. This is Mr. Lane's motion based on 
the plea in abeyance for dismissal. My inclination, just 
thinking about it, though, would be to grant that motion but 
stay its execution until the appellate court makes a ruling 
on this. But I'll hear from you. 
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MR.. FAUST: Yes, Your Honor. . It's a very -- the 
success of our motion to dismiss today resolves around the 
court's interpretation of these two statutes, 77-2 (a)-2 and 
7 7-38-11. And does the court wish me to go in — are you 
familiar with the facts or — 
THE COURT: No. I have the background. 
MR. FAUST: All right. 
THE COURT: Give me a chance to look up the statutes 
though, because I want to read them. Lets see, 77-7A-2? 
MR. FAUST: Yes. And 77-38-11 (2) (b). 
THE COURT: Maybe you can find that for me. Thank . 
you. 
MR. FAUST: The applicable part is paragraph five. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. FAUST: Okay. Your Honor, it's our position that 
the victims derive their limited appellate" rights from the 
Victims Restitution Act of 77-38-11(2) (b), which provides 
down here that adverse rulings on these actions or motions 
are requested by the victims at the time or a representative 
of a victim of the crime may be appealed under the rules 
governing the courts. And this becomes the critical section 
of the statute. "Provided that no appeal shall constitute 
grounds for delaying any criminal or juvenile proceedings." 
When that particular statute is then read in connection with 
77-38-11(2)(b), it then indicates that pleas in abeyance may 
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not be" — on misdemeanors — may not be held more than 18 
months. 
We believe that it is to a point where the 18 months • 
has expired and, therefore, this court by operation of the 
law must dismiss the criminal complaint against Brandon Lane. 
In the State vs. Casey, Justice Wilkins spoke about 
this limitation. This was a 2002 case, where he indicated that 
he recognized that there was a limited time of appeal. 
. However, nonetheless, that there were competing rights, 
constitutional rights to a speedy trial, and that when viewed 
against the victim's, rights, nonetheless, if the appellant 
victim fails to trial, perfect, argue and prevail in the 
appellate action before the proceeding below runs its course, 
then the appellate review is moot and the victim has no further 
remedy. If the court rules today that the plea in abeyance, 
that this court is governed by the 18 month time period for 
misdemeanors on a plea in abeyance, that would, in essence, 
make moot the appeal which is presently before the court of 
appeals. And then we would make a motion for a summary 
disposition to have it dismissed at the appellate level. 
We do not believe that it tolls the statute of 
limitations or the abeyance period. Furthermore, the victims 
raise, basically, three arguments against us. One, they say, 
the court's order staying the plea in abeyance tolls the 
running of the statute of limitation period. Two, the 
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defendant has suffered no hardship and, three, that the 
statutorily allowed period for plea in abeyance is really three 
years as opposed to 18 months. i 
The governing part of the statute talks in here to 
any combination of misdemeanors and felonies not or felonies. 
And so, the three year statute of limitation only applies if 
there is a felony that is also being held in abeyance as 
well, not to just misdemeanors, the 18 months applies merely 
to the misdemeanor, and that's all. This court was in its 
power to stay the entry of the conviction. But beyond the 18 
month time period, I believe that the legislature intent and 
that of the statute is such that it divests the court with 
power at that point in time and, therefore, since.he has 
completely, fully completed — complied with the terms of his 
plea in abeyance, filed an appropriate motion which the court 
then stayed in order to allow them to brief, nonetheless, 
given that remaining time period, if they don't prevail or 
perfect their right of appeal within that time period, then 
the appellate process is moot at that point in time. And the 
case must be dismissed. Does the court have any questions? 
THE COURT: I don't believe so. 
MR. FAUST: Thank you. I might mention that there 
has been numerous delays from the letter, the docketing 
statement that have been stipulated, extensions for time on 
at least two incidents. And so, there has been a slumbering 
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and a delay in the enforcement of their rights even though 
the 18 months time period. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Miss Nestel. 
MS. NESTEL: Thank you, Your Honor. It is my 
pleasure to be here this afternoon. I have not had the 
opportunity to be in Duchesne before. And just because we 
have not had this opportunity, I want to let you know that I 
am here on behalf of Patricia Hay and Peggy Hay, who are the 
victims in the case as well as their Kathy, the daughter of 
John Hay, the deceased victim. And Terry Hay, the daughter 
of Dan Hay, the deceased victim. 
Your Honor, I appreciate defense counsel's comments. 
However, I think there are some problems and flaws in the 
arguments. First of all, to address his argument that victims 
don't have a right to appeal, or that if they do appeal it can 
not delay any proceeding. First of all, I would say to that, 
in this case, as opposed to the Casey case in which Judge 
Wilkins gives a nonbinding or noncontrolling but concurrent 
opinion, however, I would just further in a second, that is 
distinguishable from this case. There was no pending 
proceeding. And there is no pending proceeding that has been 
out there or looming that the defendant counted on or banked on 
that has been delayed. We address those issues right upfront 
once the victim's motion to dismiss was denied. 
And, Your Honor, after hearing argument from defense 
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attorney, then Robert Faust, myself decided to stay the 
proceedings which, in essence, froze the case. And, in fact, 
the entire file has been sent to the court of appeals. And 
they are effectively addressing the issue now. 
My other point I want to make is the appeal made by the 
victims is not based exclusively on 77-38. Although, we do 
raise issues that the rights were violated, the right to be 
present and heard, the victim also raise additional issues 
constitutional rights, issues, the right to be treated with 
fairness, respect and dignity, their constitutional right under 
Article I Section 28 subsection (2) to be present and heard at • 
hearings. We also raised appellate claims under 77-38 (a) in a 
totally different chapter of the statute. So, the victims1 
appeal is not entirely dependent on 77-38. That is one 
component of it, but the rights violations enumerated in our PO 
stem from violations of the constitutional rights, procedural 
rights specifically, Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 as well as 
right to restitution under 77-38, 38(a). 
As well, I would like to address Judge Wilkins1 
concurring opinion. And I know this was based ad nauseam 
initially. And I know Your Honor has read the opinion. At 
first blush, I thought Justice Wilkins' opinion also was sort 
of a message that victims did not have a remedy. But reading 
it closely, and Ifm sure that you have, but if not, I encourage 
you to do so, within the first two sentences of his.opinion, he 
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indicated that the victims1 rights were violated and the guilty 
pleas should have been withdrawn. That case is distinguishable 
from this in the sense that in the Casey case there was an 
impending sentencing hearing after he had pled guilty. And 
Justice Wilkins did point out that within the six weeks period 
it would be almost impossible for a victim to initiate and 
perfect an appeal. And we are all familiar with the length of 
an appellate process, which we have dealt with as' well. But, 
in this case, we made a timely appeal. 
I would like to address defense counsel's comments 
about the delays in the case. This case has not been 
unusually delayed, The issues brought to the court of 
appeals, most of the issues are issues of first impression. 
So, that there have not been a lot of precedent in which to 
rely upon and file arguments is required extensive research. 
I personally have gone to the legislature and listened to 
hours of committee meetings, discussions about when the 
Victims1 Bill of Rights so that we could chart the statutory 
history of these different bills and present that to the 
court of appeals, which were included in our appellate 
briefs. So, there have not been unusual delays. 
And, quite honestly, defense counsel had called me in 
April and indicated he was going to need a delay in June, and 
I'm sure that after reading the statute chose not to. And he 
did file his brief without delay. 
We are scheduled. Your Honor, for argument'. And this 
clearly is a case that the court of appeals has been willing 
to accept and wants to hear argument on. And thatfs what I 
would ask the court to' uphold that process today so that we 
can get to our- own argument and get a ruling from the court 
of appeals. 
And as far as the three arguments that we have 
raised, Your Honor, realiy, the strongest one is that you 
stayed the plea in abeyance period. 
On November 20th — well, first of all, on 
•August 14th when we were, when the victims had filed our 
motion to set aside the plea, Your Honor specifically gave an 
order that was signed that it would be stayed until the trial 
court pleadings had been filed and Your Honor had ruled. You 
did rule the end of the October dismissing or ruling against 
the victims' motion to set aside. But, in teleconference on 
November 20th, where all the parties were present, the issue 
was raised, defense counsel argued-against a stay. And Your 
Honor, in fact, issued the stay. 
Specifically, the wording from the order that you 
signed was, "The plea in abeyance shall remain stayed pending 
the filing and acceptance of an appeal. If appeal is not 
accepted, the stay would be removed." 
The appeal was, in fact, accepted.. So, really, the 
only fair thing at this time, Your Honor, is to uphold your 
i n 
order and continue the stay until the court of appeals has 
addressed this. 
The defendant has not in any way been disadvantaged. 
That was a specific safeguard we put in place. It would not 
have been fair if from November until March or now or 
whenever if he had violated an additional criminal law to 
then say he has violated the plea in abeyance and he doesn't 
get that advantage. That was recognized by the victims. It 
was actually our motion to bring that forward before Your 
Honor to say he should not be held accountable to a 
disadvantage. And defense counsel brought up the motion that 
Your Honor — the order that Your Honor signed. 
Finally, to the gist of the statute that th£ defense 
attorney has cited, I really think, Your Honor, that the 
argument he makes is brought in this. If you look at the. 
language of the statute, it says, "18 months to any class of 
misdemeanor." That's a singular word. And it does not 
encompass multiple misdemeanors. When you look at what the 
intent of the statute is, if it is a misdemeanor, that means it 
was not as serious of a crime, for example, a felony or a 
combination of misdemeanors, hence, it should not be held for 
as long a period. But if you look at the statute it says, "Or 
any degree of felony." Right there, if it's a felony, it's 
automatically 36 months. .. It doesn't make sense that it would 
have to be a combination of a felony and a misdemeanor to make 
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it 36 months since one felony in and of itself shall be held 
for 36 months. So, it does make sense, it makes more sense to 
read it in terms that if there are any multiple misdemeanors, 
or it could be a combination of misdemeanors and felonies, that 
it's to be held for 36 months. That's what we are asking Your 
Honor to interpret the statute as, as well as most importantly 
the fact that Your Honor did stay it. That's understanding of 
the victims why we had proceeded and invested all the resources 
and time in conducting our appeal. And we hope in the interest 
of justice that you will uphold that stay order and we can 
continue with our progress at the court of appeals. 
THE COURT: What are you — you say the issues you 
are presenting are novel. I had a question. In this kind of 
a case, there is often a civil lawsuit or a civil settlement. 
If that were to be made, would the restitution which may be 
ordered be offset by any settlement that was taken in the 
civil case or, clearly, they wouldn't be entitled to both, 
would they? 
MS. NESTEL: Right. And I don't think the Crime 
Victims Restitution Act envisions a victim being able to 
double dip, if you will, to receive full restitution award 
and then a civil judgment as well. My understanding of the 
case law and, typically, you get a criminal judgment first, a 
restitution order, and then a subsequent civil order. 
Anything that's been paid toward restitution, typically, is 
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applied to the judgment in the civil case. So, I think 
that's accurate that the victims would not be entitled to 
more than the total amount of out-of-pocket expenses, you 
know, unless they received a civil judgment that included 
punitive damages. 
TEE COURT: I see. Second question. I had a • 
securities case, securities fraud case. The counsel 
negotiated a plea in abeyance agreement where the defendant 
was to pay back something like $200,000. And so, the plea in 
abeyance agreement from the get-go was like 18, well, let's 
see, it was probably about six years, I believe, so that he 
could amortize that out and pay these people. Well, the-
appellate court came down and said, no, Judge Anderson, you 
can't do that. It's statutory. It's jurisdictional. You 
can't have it in effect for more than three years. And the 
case was reversed. And that was it. And I have a problem 
with understanding how I could stay something that's 
jurisdictional. I mean, I already did. But, at this point, 
we have a new motion. I'm not sure how that would apply. 
Are you confident that my stay order would npt prejudice the 
rights of the defendant if the appellate court, said "Kings 
X," there can't be one that extends for more than two years? 
MS. NESTEL: I think because there are four 
misdemeanors at stake, and part of the plea in abeyance, 
mainly a multitude of misdemeanors, I am confident that you 
are within your rights to stay the plea in abeyance 
agreement, especially where it's not disadvantaged the 
defendant. If he had been at risk or liability at this time 
and, in fact, maybe violated the law. I don't know. I 
haven't done an updated search on his criminal history. But 
that may pose a problem. But where there has been no risk to 
the defendant and where the statute does allow for a 
multitude of misdemeanors be held for 36 months, I am 
confident that Your Honor's stay is within the legal limits. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MS. NESTEL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. FOOTE: Your Honor, we haven't been involved very 
much in the sense since it was taken over by Miss Nestel. I 
guess my understanding, originally, what happened here, the 
original, just to correct, actually, Miss Nestel, it wasn't 
Your Honor who signed the order in August. It was judge 
Cornby. Judge Cornby stood in for you last August for a 
while. The order at that point in time stated hereby the 
order of plea in abeyance shall be stayed from this date 
until the court has decided that all relevant issues raised 
by the parties have been resolved. Then the court came back 
on the 20th of November and entered that order to stay. What 
seems relevant to me is that when this order was signed in 
August 2006, the plea in abeyance had not terminated, had not 
run its course yet. And the court entered an order at that 
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II point in time staying things. 
2I My understanding of the stay is — (inaudible) lasts 
3I longer than 18 months. Assuming that, assuming that he were 
4 1 correct, (inaudible) 18 months. But when an order, something 
5 1 is stayed, my belief is that time is not running. And so, 
6 1 the 18 month time period would be while the plea in abeyance 
7 1 is, in effect, in effect. I believe thatfs how the court 
8I would hold. That while something is stayed, the time is 
9 1 actually not running. 
10 J THE COURT: The time.is tolled. 
Ill MR. FOOTS: The time is tolled when the court stays, 
12 1 is how I understand it to be. Well, in this matter and other 
13 1 matters as well, just as if a re-stayed sentencing on appeal, 
14 I their probation time and those things do not start running 
15 I until they get time with the appeal and come back either for 
16 1 resentencing or further hearings. 
17 TEE COURT: Let's do the math on that. If the time 
18I that is running is tolled, where are we today? What was 
19 the — 
20 J MR. FOOTE: Well, my understanding, the original plea 
211 was entered on September 12th, 2005. The initial order of 
22 1 stay was on August 14th, 2006, eleven months later. 
23 THE COURT: So, that was within the period. 
24 MR. FOOTE: It was within the original 12 months. 
25 1 Then in November, while under Judge Cornby's order, it was 
i q 
II stayed. In November, then the court entered another order, 
2 1 in which Mr. Faust actually prepared, stating it would be 
3I stayed until the court of appeals had determined all relevant 
4 1 issues. I believe that the stays operate as a time stop. 
5 J Just same way it does in criminal actions, appeals on first 
6 1 impression, whatever else, everything stops. The probation 
7 1 period doesn't start running. The jail period is not 
8 1 entered. Everything is stopped. And that's my understanding 
9 1 of what the stay is. And because it's stopped, the statute 
10I here regarding how long a plea in abeyance may be entered 
111 into, how long they last, the plea in abeyance is, in my 
12I opinion, because of the order of the court, not in effect at 
13 1 this point in time. Plea in abeyance is setting off to the 
14I side awaiting a future order from the court reinstating it or 
15 1 doing whatever it needs to do with it. 
161 THE COURT: Unless it's jurisdictional. 
17 MR. FOOTE: Maybe. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Faust? 
19 1 MR. FAUST: Yes, Your Honor. That may be the case 
20 J with cases involving things that do not derive specifically 
21I from jurisdictional or from statutory construction. However, 
22 J the legislature was very clear in talking about plea in 
23 I abeyance down here that nothing regarding the enforcement of 
24 1 appellate review, money damages, anything could not delay. 
25 1 So, the court could delay or stay the order for a period of 
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18 months. So, at 11 months, when it was stayed, that was a 
proper entered order. When it again entered a stay order in 
November, the 18 months had not yet passed, and that was 
still appropriate for it to stay. But, at the time that the 
18 months expires, I believe that the court's ability to 
continue to toll and stay the order expires at that point in 
time because it becomes jurisdictional and, specifically, 
when related to the appellate rights under the Victim's 
Reparation Act. 
In regards to the second issue raised, there has been 
a civil settlement. And there was a stipulation for 
settlement entered into which, I believe my brother argued to 
the court indicating that, civilly, they had already received 
the monies under the insurance policy and signed it, complete 
release, compromising the settlement. That was one of his 
arguments which was made subsequently. 
Furthermore, my client has been inconvenienced. He 
completely — completed all of the requirements requested by 
the court, paid the fine, attended the defensive driving 
course, and did all of them early and was anticipating that 
upon the completion of the 12 months that his plea in 
abeyance would then be dismissed by the court. And the only 
reason it got continued beyond that period of time was 
because of the actions filed by Miss Nestel and the Victim's 
Reparation after they had their opportunity to argue the 
motion to set aside the plea agreement. After that was 
denied, then the court, I believe, still had the power to 
continue to stay up through 18 months. But once the 18 
months had expired, then that ended the ability of them to 
continue their appellate review. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. This court, when it 
approves settlements, generally relies on the counsel, the 
adversary system to negotiate a settlement. And I think the 
state, county, the prosecutor has a duty, has a burden to get 
the approval of the victims. For one reason or another, 
apparently, that did not happen in this case. And I assumed 
that it had. I. apologize to the victims that are here. They 
were not, certainly not shunned by me. I inquired whether 
they were on board. I was told they were. We approved the 
deal. And we went on with our business. That having been 
said, it appears to me, and I got my hand slapped once before 
on the securities case I have told you about. I haven't read 
the opinion recently. But it seemed to me they viewed that 
as jurisdictional, and that I had no power to approve a plea 
in abeyance agreement that extended beyond — well, it had to 
extend in that case to allow the guy to pay his restitution. 
But they said, no, it can't exceed three years. So, on that 
basis, I'm going to go ahead and grant the defendant's motion 
to dismiss this case on jurisdictional grounds. I don't 
think I have the power to stay that any longer. Although, it 
would be —• I would be interested in the court of appeals' 
decision on this case of the issues that have been raised. 
My understanding is they are fairly novel issues. And, Miss 
Nestel, maybe some day you can get them before that again. 
But I'm going to grant the motion to allow the defendant to 
withdraw his plea. And this case is dismissed. 
. MR. FAUST: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. NESTEL: May I ask that you have defense counsel 
write a written order so that that be signed? Because we 
anticipate an appeal. 
THE COURT: Certainly. Will you prepare an order? 
MR. FAUST: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
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